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Monitoring Governmental Disposition
of Assets: Fashioning Regulatory
Substitutes for Market Controls
Harold J. Krent
Nicholas S. Zeppos 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1705 (1999)
Each year, the government sells and leases public assets worth
billions of dollars. FCC auctions to allocate rights to electromagnetic
spectrum generated over twenty billion dollars within a three-year
period, and proceeds from mineral leases, timber sales, and disposition
of real estate from defaulting thrifts have surpassed several billion
dollars annually.
From the taxpayer's perspective, however, government sales and
leases have been deplorable. The government has donated valuable
resources to preferred claimants, allocated scarce broadcast and oil
rights resources by lottery, and sold both public land and mineral
rights to private parties at a fraction of the market price. Although the
government in disposing assets may have legitimate programmatic,
distributional, and social preservationist objectives unrelated to any
financial maximization goal, our analysis of three particular disposi-
tion schemes-mining claims, grazing fees, and allocation of the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum-suggests that those aims too often have masked
inefficiency or graft.
Existing oversight of agency disposition programs is woefully
deficient, and we trace the historical, conceptual, and political roots of
the regulatory failure. For a mixture of reasons, Congress exempted
asset dispositions from the APA's rulemaking provisions; judicially
imposed justiciability requirements have limited participation in adju-
dications affecting governmental disposition programs; and agencies
themselves have declined to permit third parties to question the propri-
ety of various asset dispositions. The inadequate monitoring exacer-
bates the absence of any market-type discipline as in the private sector.
Accordingly, we argue that Congress and agencies should adopt,
where possible, schemes to maximize return on assets sold or leased,
minimizing the need for external monitoring. Given that the govern-
ment will still pursue non-financial objectives, we propose that the APA
rulemaking exemption for asset disposition be rescinded. We also
suggest that courts and agencies permit greater participation in adju-
dications over transfer of public assets. In light of the shortcomings of
judicial review as a monitoring mechanism, however, we recommend
amending Executive Order 12,866 to include government disposition of
assets within the scope of agency action subject to cost-benefit analysis.
The change would help ensure both that agencies justify their depar-
ture from financial maximization principles and that they use the most
cost-effective means of structuring divestiture programs. Similarly,
Congress should amend the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act to permit Congress time to study all major agency disposi-
tion initiatives-as with other significant agency rules-before they go
into effect. Finally, we also suggest revising the pay-as-you go or
PAYGO budget mechanism to include below-market asset sales and
leases within the direct spending that must be matched by additional
revenue measures. These measures would help promote greater ac-
countability in the disposition of government assets, ultimately result-
ing in greater return to the Treasury and more effective pursuit of non-
monetary goals
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INTRODUCTION
The federal government owns in excess of two trillion dollars in
assets. The public lands constitute the largest portion of such assets,
with the federal government owning approximately fifty percent of
the land in eleven Western states, including almost ninety percent of
Nevada and Alaska. The federal government also owns billions of
dollars in other tangible and intangible assets such as buildings,
power plants, control over the electromagnetic spectrum, weapons
systems, and patents.1
1. See infra note 30 (discussing federal land ownership in the West); OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2000: ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTiVES 25 (reporting over two trillion dollars in assets, including gold reserves and other
monetary costs) [hereinafter BUDGET].
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Government sales and leases of such assets occupy one of the
dustiest corners of public law. The sales of land parcels, auctions of
apartment buildings, and the lease of mineral rights are not the stuff
of which headlines (or law reviews) are made. Congress largely leaves
such disposition to the discretion of agency officials, and thus little
public oversight accompanies most governmental decisions to sell,
lease, or give away governmental assets. Nor are such dispositions of
assets subject to market controls. Stock prices do not fall if evidence
of inefficiency or graft is uncovered.
The importance of such dispositions, however, should not be
overlooked. The potential impact on the economy is staggering. For
example, the FCC auctions to allocate rights to electromagnetic spec-
trum for operators of personal communications systems generated
almost twenty-three billion dollars within a thirty-six month period.?
Proceeds from the sale and lease of other public assets currently
exceed billions of dollars annually?
Yet, to date, most government disposition schemes have failed
on a grand scale. Inefficiency, interest group influence, and graft
abound. The government has donated valuable resources to preferred
claimants, allocated scarce broadcast and oil rights resources by lot-
tery, and sold both public land and the rights to the minerals beneath
to private entities at a fraction of the market price.4 The government
has also sold timber without any apparent cost-benefit justification,5
and recently awarded rights to use electromagnetic spectrum worth
somewhere between ten and seventy billions of dollars to network
broadcast companies for free.6 If such dispositions were administered
on a market-type basis, billions of dollars could be raised annually.
What accounts for the apparent mismanagement and at times
virtual give-away of valuable public resources? Part of the answer
lies in history. The government initially divested land and mineral
rights when they seemed of little value, and when the benefits from
spurring private industry clearly outweighed any loss to the public
2. See, e.g., FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, FCC REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
SPECTRUM AUCTIONS (1997) [hereinafter FCC REPORT]; FCC Urges Congress to Modify Auction
Process, COMM. TODAY, Oct. 17, 1997.
3. Although no exact figure is possible, fees generated from oil leases on the Outer
Continental Shelf approach five billion dollars annually, and timber sales amount to over one
billion dollars. Other programs, taken together, generate hundreds of millions of dollars. See
Perry R. Hagenstein, The Federal Lands Today: Uses and Limits, in RETHINKING THE FEDERAL
LANDS 74, 93-94 (Sterling Brubacker ed., 1984).
4. See infra notes 91-92.
5. See infra note 177.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 168-70.
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treasury. Change, however, has stripped laws governing disposition
of government assets of their original function.
Part of the answer also lies in interest group lobbying. Private
entities have successfully lobbied Congress for public resources to
subsidize their own financial activities. Interest group influence
continues post-enactment, with groups exerting leverage to retain
legislative benefits. Moreover, private groups have similarly curried
favor with agencies to obtain (or retain) government largesse. Such
governmental subsidization reflects the organizational advantages of
the few who can benefit at the expense of the less well-organized
public.
But part of the answer lies as well with a failure of conceptu-
alization. While Congress has long used its assets to attain a variety
of nonfiscal policy goals-principally programmatic and distribu-
tional-courts and agencies have viewed sale and lease decisions as
property transactions immune from the same scrutiny that would be
afforded other agency regulatory efforts. Indeed, the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") largely exempts property from its scope;' the
President has failed to include most asset management determina-
tions within Executive Order 12,866, which regulates major agency
initiatives;8 and Congress has excluded disposition decisions from
restraints imposed on other spending and regulatory decisions.9
Moreover, judges have often refused to permit outsiders to the trans-
actions to participate in the process preceding the decisions, despite
the fact that such transactions can have a dramatic effect upon third
parties."0 Understanding government sales and leases as arrows in
the government's quiver of regulatory strategies is critical to formu-
lating a more effective oversight strategy.
No single explanation can possibly cover the countless different
government programs to dispose of public assets. The history and
goals of the programs sharply diverge. The sale of cars forfeited to
law enforcement agencies only faintly resembles allocation of grazing
rights to ranchers. Yet common themes, such as problems of rent-
seeking and insufficient monitoring, arise in many of the programs,
justifying analysis of the government disposition efforts as a group.
7. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1994) (exempting from rulemaking matters relating to "public
property, loans, grants, benefits or contracts').
8. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
557-61 (1994).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 207-18.
10. See infra Part ImI.B.2.c for a discussion of current standing doctrine.
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In Part I, we explore the origins of governmental ownership of
assets. The government has acquired assets in myriad ways, princi-
pally through open market transactions, through its exercise of sover-
eignty," and through its exercise of regulatory authority. 2 Despite
the contrasting avenues through which the government has acquired
such assets, we conclude that the manner of origin should not affect
the subsequent question of how the government should dispose of the
assets. We believe that Article IV of the Constitution, which
empowers Congress "to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting... Property belonging to the United States,""
imposes no significant restraints on the government's disposition of
public property. Principles of majoritarian governance favor severing
consideration of how the asset was acquired from the subsequent
consideration of how to dispose of the asset once it is no longer
needed.
We then consider in Part H what purposes government dispo-
sition of assets can serve. In addition to generating revenue, the sale
and lease of assets can further a variety of goals. Divestiture or lease
can serve programmatic goals such as encouraging mineral produc-
tion or providing an incentive for individuals to move to less densely
settled areas of the country. Or, a lease of government assets can
help ensure that the public receives the best service from private use
of a scarce asset, whether a national park or band of electromagnetic
spectrum. Disposition decisions may also serve distributional goals,
empowering economically disadvantaged individuals, or rewarding
others such as veterans for past service. Similarly, the disposition
decision can implement social preservationist goals by supporting a
particularly valued way of life, whether that of small ranchers or
individual miners.
In evaluating the efficacy of three prominent disposition
schemes, however,-mining claims, grazing fees, and allocation of the
broadcast spectrum-we suggest that government sales and leases
have suffered from a lack of internal and external safeguards.
Government attempts to generate revenue escape any market-type
discipline, and government policy concerns in deviating from revenue
maximization principles reveal hidden subsidies that are unlikely to
11. Our government acquired much of its land through conquest and treaty. See infra
notes 27-30.
12. The recent auctions to allocate use of the electromagnetic spectrum provide a notable
example. See also infra note 35.
13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
1999] 1709
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
serve the public interest. The government's departures from market-
based principles have not generated sufficient nonmonetary objectives
to justify the loss of revenue to the fisc.14
In Part HI we analyze the current regulatory terrain to deter-
mine why adequate safeguards do not exist. First, insufficient moni-
toring stems, in part, from interest group politics. Those most
directly affected by government disposition determinations-miners
seeking minerals on public land, ranchers seeking to graze livestock
on public land, or broadcasters seeking electromagnetic bands-can
organize effectively to obtain subsidies from Congress. In contrast,
each taxpayer stands to lose only minimally in any legislative contest
over a particular disposition program. Thus, Congress arguably
crafted disposition programs with an eye toward rewarding interest
groups that in turn can support influential legislators through cam-
paign contributions and the like. Second, despite the presence of
goals other than revenue maximization, Congress, agencies, and
courts have all failed in recognizing the regulatory aspects of the sale
and lease decision. The APA exempts property transactions from
rulemaking constraints, and courts and agencies have limited third
party access to much adjudication. Little public participation, there-
fore, leavens some of the most far reaching agency actions affecting
the use of public assets.
Encouraging greater rulemaking would not by itself ensure
sufficient monitoring. For example, the Bureau of Land Management
permits public input into formulating Resource Allocation Plans, yet
the plans do not make the hard trade offs between environmental
values and grazing utility in particular geographical areas.15 Rather,
those decisions are reached at the adjudicative stage such as when the
agency determines what type of permit to grant.
Greater oversight through public participation is therefore
needed at the adjudicative as well as the rulemaking stages.
Stringent standing doctrine currently prevents many parties
interested in government disposition efforts from shaping individual
decisions on permits, leases, or sales. Agencies furthermore have
14. In this Article, we do not directly consider whether some of the government's assets
should be privatized. We are sympathetic with those advocating privatization to the extent that
current management schemes are too often suspect, but we are sympathetic as well with some
of the non-financial goals that can be pursued through use of government assets-goals that
might be much harder to attain if the assets were fully privatized. Once governmental assets
are sold, whether land or a piece of electromagnetic spectrum, it is far more difficult to achieve
legitimate non-financial policy objectives. Instead, we argue that the government should
structure disposition initiatives based more overtly on market principles.
15. See infra note 123.
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attempted to prevent those who have standing from participating in
some disposition efforts."6 More fundamentally, judicial review of
adjudication between claimants and a governmental agency often
provides but a scant check. When the government agrees with the
claimant about the propriety of a lease term or royalty agreement, no
meaningful oversight exists. If market-type mechanisms such as
auctions or competitive leases existed, the failure to solicit third-party
participation would not be troublesome. Public participation,
however, should be encouraged in adjudications in which nonfinancial
concerns, whether programmatic or distributional, play a part.
In Part IV, we argue that reform is needed at two levels. First,
Congress and agencies should adopt schemes to maximize return on
assets sold or leased." When agencies seek to maximize revenue
through disposition efforts, external monitoring is not as critical.
Political oversight may be needed to ensure that an effective sales
program is designed, but not to monitor each subsequent sale or lease.
Market mechanisms, whether an auction or competitive lease, con-
strain the potential for self-interested or arbitrary bureaucratic
action. Congress, in other words, should turn to the market to guide
agencies' disposition efforts."8 Second, when nonmonetary concerns
take precedence, agencies should allow greater public participation in
both rulemaking and adjudication to help ensure that any loss to the
Treasury is justified.
Consequently, we make several recommendations for regula-
tory change that are particularly needed in contexts where market
mechanisms insufficiently restrain disposition decisions. First, we
advocate greater public participation in shaping such disposition
schemes. Rescinding the APA exemption will not by itself guarantee
sufficient public participation, but it might have heuristic value in
highlighting the regulatory aspects of disposition of government
assets. Moreover, greater public participation in adjudications might
provide needed monitoring in contexts in which rent-seeking is likely
more rife. Second, we urge amending Executive Order 12,866 to
include government disposition of assets within the scope of agency
16. See, e.g., infra note 271 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1994 & Supp. I1 1997)
(requiring agencies to consider economic impact of regulations on small businesses and making
agency explanation subject to judicial review); Exec. Order No. 12,866, §§ 1(a), 1(b)(6), 3 C.F.R.
638, 638-39 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 557 (1994) (requiring agencies to
undertake cost-benefit analysis).
18. Cf. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law For a New Century, in THE PROVINCE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 90, 112-14 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997) (arguing that globalization will
increase the need for administrative law to incorporate market mechanisms).
1999] 1711
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
actions subject to cost-benefit analysis. Amending the Executive
Order would require agencies to articulate the purposes underlying
sales and leases, clarify the costs and benefits underlying the pro-
grams, and encourage the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
to become expert in designing leases and sales. Conversely, Congress
should amend the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness
Act of 1996"s to allow Congress time to study all major agency disposi-
tion initiatives-as with other significant agency rules-before they
go into effect. Congress should also amend the pay-as-you-go or
PAYGO budget mechanism to include below market sales and leases
within the direct spending that must be matched by additional reve-
nue measures. Problems undoubtedly would remain, but the changes
sketched above-which could be accomplished without the need to
design radically different oversight procedures-would help promote
greater accountability in the use and disposition of government
assets, ultimately resulting in greater financial return to the
Treasury and more effective implementation of nonmonetary goals.
I. GOVERNMENTAL ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY
Government assets today run the gamut from real to intangi-
ble property, and from financial to regulatory assets. With respect to
land holdings, the government is by far the largest landowner in the
nation. The government also owns substantial chattel, including
books, furniture, and satellites. The government actively trades in
less tangible property, for instance, by buying and selling securities
on the open market, and it has rights in intellectual property such as
copyrights and patents.2 Finally, the government itself creates prop-
erty through its exercise of regulatory authority-selling rights to
sulfur dioxide emissions and to the use of the broadcast spectrum-
property that we term regulatory assets. Throughout history, the gov-
ernment has sold, leased, and given away all forms of assets.
The origins and uses of such assets plainly differ, as do the
reasons for disposition. The history and procedures of grazing fees
contrast sharply with the FCC's licensing of electromagnetic spec-
19. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Tit. H, Pub. L. No. 104-
121, 110 Stat. 857, 857-74 (1996). See infra text accompanying notes 338-45.
20. 2 U.S.C. § 902 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). See infra text accompanying notes 346-49.
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 5207(a)(1) (1994) (authorizing government agencies to own patents);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 3710c(a)(3) (1994) (authorizing royalties to be paid to government
inventors).
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trum, and HUD's role in selling apartment buildings does not closely
resemble the Forest Service's sale of timber located in the National
Forests. Accordingly, some may argue that any analysis combining
such disparate programs can only obfuscate the issues by failing to
provide a sufficiently contextual analysis of each program.
We agree in part. We cannot hope to do justice to the intrica-
cies of various programs, and we are well aware that we may over-
simplify the successes and weaknesses of each. Nonetheless, we
believe that grouping the government's disposition efforts together is
ultimately rewarding. Common themes arise in administering many
of the programs, such as problems of rent-seeking, monitoring, and
providing for the optimal level of public participation. Furthermore,
by examining the disposition programs as a package, we hope to
explore whether some pan-agency reforms are possible to limit rent-
seeking and maximize the public's return for the sale and lease of
government assets.
A. Origins of Government Property
The government has acquired property in divergent ways.
Much like private sector entities, it has purchased assets in open
market transactions. It has also seized property to satisfy security
interests. Unlike private parties, however, it has acquired property
through its exercise of sovereignty-in conquest, via treaty, and
through regulation. In this section, we explore such diverse routes to
ownership, and then inquire whether the way in which the govern-
ment acquires property should play any role in its subsequent disposi-
tion decision.
When the government buys assets in the open market, just as
a private entity would, its subsequent decision to sell such assets
presumably should be subject to market-type scrutiny. Most open
market acquisitions closely mirror activities in the private sector.
Agencies buy computers, the Navy buys ships, and the General
Services Administration ("GSA") purchases (through eminent domain
or otherwise) land on which to build government buildings. Those
purchases should be subject to public oversight. When government
officials pay too much for goods in the private market-four hundred
dollars, for instance, for a hammer--they should be disciplined; and
22. See Andrew Ferguson, Beltspeak, Political Jargon in Washington, D.C., NAT'L REv.,
Nov. 18, 1991, at 64 (making reference to rumors of absurd federal spending).
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similarly if officials sell a $400 machine for $4.00,23 eyebrows should
be raised.
The federal government also acquires property in other ways
analogous to private parties. It receives property through bequests,
2 4
and much like creditors everywhere, the government amasses a sub-
stantial amount of property through forfeitures, such as through
failure to pay HUD-backed mortgages, or federal taxes.25  As in
private industry, government scientists, military personnel, and phy-
sicians have invented technologies and machinery protected by patent
laws. The government's decision to divest such property may simi-
larly track that of entities in the private sector. For example, the
government has often attempted to maximize revenue when selling
cars obtained through forfeiture or rugs seized at customs.
2
In addition, unlike the typical acquisition in the private sector,
the government acquires assets through the exercise of its sover-
eignty. The government obtained expansive tracts of land at the
conclusion of the War for Independence,27 through the Louisiana
Purchase,28 and through the purchase of Alaskan lands.29 Through
acts of conquest and treaty, the federal government today owns fifty
percent of the land in the eleven Western states, including almost
ninety percent of Alaska." Some of the federal land has been set
aside for parks, some is leased for private development, and a sub-
stantial portion-estimated today at 90 million acres-remains un-
surveyed.31 Almost all of the federal government's land is open to
mineral development by interested private parties, and much is open
to grazing by neighboring ranchers. The government estimates the
23. See, e.g., Daniel Southerland, Proposed Sale of California Oil Field Assailed as
Government Giveaway, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1995, at A17.
24. See United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 95 (1950) (holding that, while the United
States may receive gifts and bequests, state law can restrict transferor's ability to make such
gifts and bequests).
25. Other forfeitures stem from the government's unique law enforcement powers, and
thus are unlike acquisitions in the private sector.
26. See Auction of Seized Items to Raise Cash for Agencies, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1999, at B4;
see also Drug Ship Set to be Auctioned, HOUS. CHRON., May 27, 1999, at B1.
27. See generally PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAw DEVELOPMENT 49-74
(1968).
28. The nation's land was nearly doubled as a result of the purchase. See id. at 77.
29. See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS
2 (1993) [hereinafter PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS].
30. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WEST 16 (1992).
31. See PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 100.
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value of these holdings at over 600 billion dollars.32 Utilization of the
land has a tremendous impact not only on the nation's fisc, but on the
economy and environment of the West in particular.
Moreover, unlike entities in the private sector, the government
creates a type of property through its exercise of regulatory authority
by becoming the stakeholder for scarce resources such as broadcast
spectrum rights or landing slots at airports. For instance, consider
the problem of sulfur dioxide emissions by private industry. Many
regulatory options exist, including command-and-control regulation
enforced by citizen suits, civil fines, and criminal sanctions. The
option currently selected by the government, however, is to provide
market-based incentives for diminished future emissions.33  The
government sets an emission target for prior users, and permits emis-
sion rights to be bought and sold on the secondary market. The
government certainly does not own the sulfur dioxide emissions in
any traditional sense. In the absence of government action, there
would not likely be a market to sell or buy such emissions."4 Nor does
the government currently reap any financial benefits from the auc-
tions. Nonetheless, the government could charge others for (or other-
wise allocate) the right to emit sulfur dioxide as part of a regulatory
scheme for limiting overall emissions. The government in essence has
created property through a regulatory or licensing scheme. There is
scant limit to such government steps. The government may allocate
rights to use any scarce resource that it does not own-whether fish
or broadcast medium-and receive recompense, as long as the regula-
tory scheme itself passes constitutional muster. 5
32. See BUDGET, supra note 1, at 25; Marion Clawson, Major Alternatives for Future
Management of the Federal Lands, in RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS, supra note 3, at 195,
198.
33. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (1994). The sulfur dioxide auction in March 1995, for
instance, generated almost twenty-three million dollars. See Acid rain auction is successful, 103
AM. METAL MARKET, Apr. 11, 1995, at 5, available in 1995 WL 8069781. Government regulation
in that context represents the flip side of regulation of the electromagnetic spectrum-the
government regulates not because of scarcity, but in effect to make pollution more scarce.
34. Even after the auction, private entities may not enjoy a property right in emission
allowances. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(f). For a discussion, see generally Susan A. Austin,
Comment, Tradable Emissions Programs: Implications Under the Takings Clause, 26 ENVTL. L.
323 (1996) (concluding that a takings claim in the area of tradable emissions permits is likely to
fail).
35. Federal Fishery Management Councils have experimented with transferable quotas of
fish. See ScoT LEHMANN, PRIVATIZING PUBLIC LANDS 15 (1995); see also Thorvaldur Gylfason,
The pros and cons of fishing fees: The case of Iceland, 33 EUR. FREE TRADE Ass'N BULL. 6 (1992)
(arguing for governmental sale of fishing rights in Iceland); Peter Passell, U.S. Giving Certain
Boat Owners Exclusive Rights to Fish Off Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1991, at Al. This regu-
latory option may represent a back door way for the government to assert a property interest in
17151999]
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B. Relevance of Government's Distinctive Role in Acquiring Property
From the outset, therefore, the government has acquired prop-
erty in ways quite distinct from the typical private owner." The
unique origins of the public land system may, therefore, argue for
different priorities in disposing of the land.37 Some have labeled the
government's ownership of such land a public trust, such that the
government may use the land only as a necessary means of preserving
public values that cannot be furthered through private ownership.38
Thus, when the government obtains lands through an act of sover-
eignty, its utilization of such resources arguably should be consistent
with a public trust over the land. 9 Similarly if the government
acquires an asset through its exercise of regulatory authority, any
proceeds arguably should be related to that regulatory objective."
Indeed, restrictions on the federal government's power over
public lands have a constitutional dimension. Article IV of the
Constitution, which provides in relevant part that Congress has the
power "to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States," may impose limits on governmental use of public property.41
Politicians as well as academics have argued that the federal govern-
ment enjoys no governmental power over landholdings (unconnected
items, such as air, that it would otherwise lack constitutional power to seize as property. Only
the doctrines of federalism and regulatory takings limit the federal government's power in this
respect.
36. The first Congress determined that the proceeds of public land sales were to be used to
retire the national debt. The price of land was set at $2.00 an acre, with the smallest tract to be
sold was 640 acres. See Paul W. Gates, The Federal Lands: Why We Retained Them, in
RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS, supra note 3, at 35, 37. The federal government has given
some 325 million acres to the states, see PUrLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 4, making
each state often the second largest landholder within its boundaries, see George Cameron
Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management U. The
Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 7 (1982).
37. Because of the origins, some today argue that the federal government should cede
control of the lands to states and municipalities. See infra note 136.
38. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Claim for Retention of the Public Lands, in
RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS, supra note 3, at 125.
39. The trust may benefit states, cf. LEGISLATIVE COMM'N OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
BUREAU, STATE OF NEV., BULLETIN NO. 77-6, MEANS OF DERIVING ADDITIONAL STATE BENEFITS
FROM PUBLIC LANDS, at 1-39 (1976) (arguing that federal acquisition of public land was to be
held in a trust for the benefit of the respective states), or the people themselves. See Charles
Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269 (1980).
40. In the sulfur dioxide program, the statute prohibits the federal government from
retaining any of the proceeds generated from the auctions. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651o(b),
7651o(d)(3)(A) (1994).
41. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. Article I, section 8 vests Congress with the authority to
legislate over federal government lands not located within any state, as well as federal lands on
which forts and other federal governmental buildings stand. See US CONST. art I, § 8.
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to forts, post offices, etc.) within the several states.2 Rather, the
federal government enjoys only the rights of any other land proprie-
tor, which includes the power to sell or lease the land, subject to state
law.
As a matter of both policy and constitutional law, however, we
reject the argument that the government's use or disposition of prop-
erty should be limited either by the purpose for which it was obtained,
or by an overly crabbed reading of the Constitution. First, as a policy
matter, principles of majoritarian governance favor permitting the
government flexibility to dispose of such assets irrespective of the
original purpose. Society's identity changes over time. Births,
deaths, immigration, and emigration all transform the political com-
munity. Even if historical context suggests that the government
should retain particular lands or devote proceeds from auctions to
particular programs, the current majority should be free to reassess
objectives.
To be sure, if the federal government unwisely alienates land
or other public assets, succeeding generations may be greatly harmed.
Once wilderness is plundered, restoring its splendor may prove im-
possible. Yet, our government continuously makes decisions that may
have an adverse impact on generations to follow, whether by failing to
take strict enough measures to protect the ozone layer or by spending
excessively. The current majority, for better or worse, can harm
future generations in a great many ways. Public asset decisions
should not be treated any differently from budgetary or environ-
mental decisions generally. Thus, as social conditions change, the
government should be able to respond to such changes and alienate
property or charge full price for assets under its control despite the
historical understandings. Any reliance interests should be taken
into account by policymakers, but that reliance should not automati-
cally trump the considered judgment of current leaders. A current
majority need not be ruled by the dead hand of majorities past.
An instructive analogy is presented by the government's
authority to use property obtained through its power of eminent
42. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ.
L. REV. 283 (1976) (tracing the development of federal and state power over different classes of
federal property); see also Rights of the States: Hearing on S. 1629, the Tenth Amendment
Enforcement Act of 1996 Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of Roger J. Marzulla, lawyer) (criticizing overexpansive interpretation of the federal
government's Article IV power over public lands); Jim Fisher, Court disposes of 17-year-old case
of claim jumping, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB., Sept. 12, 1996, at 6A (addressing view of Idaho
politicians).
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domain. The federal government can only exercise that power if it
plans to use the targeted property for a public purpose." Similarly,
the government can only purchase land or charge private entities for
the right to use broadcast medium if a public purpose is satisfied.44
But once the exercise of eminent domain is complete, then the
government acquires title to the property and can dispose of the land
as it deems proper.45
The constitutional argument constraining the federal govern-
ment's power over federal lands located within states is no more
persuasive. Although there is perhaps room to debate the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century precedents construing Article IV,"
the Supreme Court clearly articulated the rule in Kieppe v. New
Mexico that the federal government's control over federal property
under Article IV is "without limitations."47 There, the Court consid-
ered a challenge to Congress's authority to protect wild horses and
burros on public lands from state sanctioned destruction. The Court
reasoned that "Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and
of a legislature over the public domain."48 Moreover, nothing in Arti-
43. The public purpose requirement for eminent domain also is not demanding. See, e.g.,
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-43 (1984) (approving eminent domain for
subdivision of large land holdings); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954) (approving use
of eminent domain for urban redevelopment).
44. The Equal Protection Clause demands that at least some public purpose be found in
every regulatory measure. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464
(1981); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976).
45. For instance, years after the federal government established Camp Breckenridge in
Kentucky upon property acquired through eminent domain, it decided to close the base and sell
mineral rights to the land. The original owners of the tracts sought to rescind the government's
prior exercise of eminent domain. In dismissing the case, the Sixth Circuit explained that "[t]he
subsequent abandonment of Camp Breckenridge did not affect the validity of the government's
title to the land acquired by condemnation.... [Rather,] [t]he validity of title is determined by
the conditions existing at the time of the taking." Higginson v. United States, 384 F.2d 504, 507
(6th Cir. 1967); see also Beistline v. City of San Diego, 256 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir. 1958)
(approving sale of land obtained for municipal airport); United States v. Three Parcels of Land,
224 F. Supp. 873, 875-76 (D. Alaska 1963) (holding that the government need not retain seized
land as post office).
46. Compare Albert W. Brodie, A Question of Enumerated Powers: Constitutional Issues
Surroun'ding Federal Ownership of the Public Lands, 12 PAc. L.J. 693, 698-723 (1981)
(reviewing the early history behind the federal property clauses and critiquing the theories
concerning the federal right to own and control public lands), and Engdahl, supra note 42, at
310-38, with George Cameron Coggins & A. Dan Tarlock, Myth as Law: The Erroneous
Historical Foundations of Public Land Law (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Vanderbilt
Law Review), and Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic"Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 617, 638-51 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme Court's expansive view of the federal
government's property clause power is supported by earlier precedent).
47. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) (quoting United States v. San
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940)).
48. Id. at 540.
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cle IV turns on the manner in which the federal government acquired
the property, and no constitutional restriction in any event applies to
governmental disposition of interests other than land, whether
buildings or the electromagnetic spectrum. Congress, therefore, can
utilize its landholdings to further any objective falling within the
enumerated powers of the federal government.
In short, therefore, despite the various means by which the
government can obtain assets-market exchange, exercise of sover-
eignty, or regulatory authority-its discretion in divesting those
assets should not turn on the way in which the assets were acquired.49
Instead, the government should be free to utilize or divest such assets
as contemporary objectives dictate. And, as we discuss below, the
government has sought wide-ranging goals in disposing of govern-
ment assets.
II. THE GOVERNMENT'S DISPOSITION DECISION
A. Governmental Objectives
The government has long sought many objectives in selling,
leasing, and otherwise disposing of government assets. A promise of
property can be a powerful tool in encouraging particular behavior,
and a sale or lease may resemble regulation of private conduct far
more than its outward trappings would suggest. Although generation
of revenue has long been an important consideration in disposing of
assets, other goals have existed alongside.
1. Maximizing Return to the Government
Like entities in the private sector, the government often seeks
to maximize revenue in selling or leasing assets. The profit motive at
times governs FBI sales of seized cars, Customs' auction of seized
assets, and the GSA's sale of government property when no longer
needed. The government may maximize return for each asset sold or
leased.
Asset disposition schemes have had mixed success in maxi-
mizing return on the government's assets. Some mechanisms, such as
the use of lotteries to give away government assets, have been notori-
49. Indeed, the first Congress offered the public lands for sale in part to retire the debt
from the Revolutionary War.
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ous for their departure from revenue-maximizing principles." Simi-
larly, the Mining Act of 1872 gives away valuable mineral rights on
public land for a mere pittance.5 Others, like royalties on coal extrac-
tion on public lands, may be much more effective in raising revenue."
The trend toward auctions in allocating use of the electromagnetic
spectrum and in assigning oil leases on the Outer-Continental Shelf
reflects the greater use of efficient mechanisms to maximize revenue,
even though disagreement still exists over which specific auction
system is optimal in a given context.3 In part, therefore, government
disposition of assets should be evaluated just like any private entity's
sale or lease of its assets-does the disposition maximize return to the
government?
The government may use resources in a way that maximizes
return not on the asset itself but for the economy as a whole. Argu-
ably, land grants for railroads, while failing to maximize return for
land,54 represented a sound investment in the nation's economy. The
government's various Homestead Acts reflected an effort to encourage
internal migration west in order to develop the nascent economy.55
50. For a discussion of lotteries for onshore oil and gas exploration, see CARL J. MAYER &
GEORGE A. RILEY, PUBLIC DOMAIN, PRIVATE DOMINION: A HISTORY OF PUBLIC MINERAL POLICY
IN AMERICA 197-99 (1985). Congress discontinued the lotteries in the Federal Onshore Oil and
Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, Title IV, Subtitle B, 101 Stat. 1330-256
(1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
51. See An Act to promote the Development of the mining Resources of the United States
§ 6, 17 Stat. 91, 92-93 (1872) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1994)).
52. For an evaluation of the royalty system, see STEPHEN L. MCDONALD, THE LEASING OF
FEDERAL LANDS FOR FOSSIL FUELS PRODUCTION 98-102 (1979); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT,
MANAGEMENT OF FUEL AND NONFUEL MINERALS IN FEDERAL LAND: CURRENT STATUS AND
ISSUES 150-54 (1979) [hereinafter MANAGEMENT OF FUEL].
53. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF
ECONOMIC LIFE (1992); Paul R. Milgrom, Auction Theory, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY:
FIFTH WORLD CONGRESS 1 (Truman F. Bewley ed., 1987). The FCC struggled to address the
aftermath of its 1996 auctions for "C-block" spectrum. Small firms bid so steeply for the licenses
that many subsequently defaulted on installment payments to the FCC. The amount owed was
approximately nine billion dollars. The FCC may have erred strategically by granting smaller
firms bidding credits or by affording the option of installment payments, which placed the
agency in the awkward position of a lending institution. See Sandra Guy, Irrational
Exuberance, 233 TELEPHONY 5 (Sept. 29, 1997); Martin L. Stern & David Rice, Fallout From the
C-Block Debacle Threatens to Cost Small Businesses Their Best Chance to Participate in
Spectrum-Based Telecom Services, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 13, 1997, at 836. For the Congressional
Budget Office Report examining the defaults, see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, IMPENDING
DEFAULTS BY WINNING BIDDERS IN THE FCC'S C BLOCK AUCTION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS (1997).
The FCC was forced to declare a moratorium on the installments due. See FCC REPORT, supra
note 2, at 31.
54. For a discussion, see Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 36, at 11-14, & n.75.
55. PAUL J. CULHANE, PUBLIC LANDS POLITICS: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE ON THE
FOREST SERVICE AND THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 76-79 (1981); see also WILKINSON,
supra note 30, at 19, 247-48.
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Similarly, a corporation may sell assets at a below market cost in
order to attain some other (legitimate) corporate objective, such as
stimulating future demand. Thus, even when the government does
not maximize return on a particular asset, it may act in the nation's
overall financial interest. Evaluating whether such measures have
substantially contributed to the economy's overall growth is quite
difficult, and the government's method of accomplishing such goals
may still be suspect." Nonetheless, the overall efficiency of any dis-
position program should consider not only the financial return on the
specific asset, but also the impact on the economy as a whole.
Unlike entities in the private sector, however, the government
often seeks objectives other than maximizing return on particular
assets. Through the sale and lease of assets, the government may
effect programmatic, distributional, and social preservation goals.
Government disposition efforts therefore must be evaluated under
criteria in addition to maximizing financial return on assets.
2. Programmatic Interests
In selling and leasing assets, the government seeks various
programmatic goals. One goal relates to the market for the asset
itself. The government can sell or buy assets merely to affect supply
and demand. Financial securities present a case in point. The
Federal Open Market Committee ('FOMC")buys and sells government
securities to modulate the rate of economic growth and, correspond-
ingly, the inflation rate. 7 Conversely, the government, which has
stockpiled particular minerals of strategic importance, such as oil or
beryllium, has hesitated selling such assets when no longer of use for
fear of depressing the private market.58 The same has been true for
the Resolution Trust Corporation's delay in selling property it seized
from failed thrifts-if the government had put all of the properties on
56. For instance, Congress granted land to railroad interests to stimulate construction of
the railroads, but those grants may have been far more generous than necessary to ensure that
the lines were completed. See MAYER & RILEY, supra note 50, at 120-21; Paul S. Dempsey,
Regulation and Antitrust Immunity in Transportation: The Genesis and Evolution of this
Endangered Species, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 335 (1983)
57. See Mark F. Bernstein, Note, The Federal Open Market Committee and the Sharing of
Governmental Power with Private Citizens, 75 VA. L. REV. 111, 114-18 (1989) (discussing the
operations of the FOMO).
58. Not surprisingly, entrenched interests opposed the move. See John J. Fialka, Federal
Uranium-Enrichment Program Will Be Sold in Public Stock Offering, WALL ST. J., June 30,
1998, at A20; David Prizinsky, Pentagon Proposal May Hinder Brush Wellman, CRAIN'S CLEV.
BUS., Aug. 7, 1995, at 3.
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the market at one time, the private market would have suffered con-
siderably. 9
Another type of programmatic objective lies in how a private
entity will use an asset sold or leased by the government. When
leasing concessions at National Parks, for instance, the government
may have a programmatic interest in the type of service provided by
the concessionaire, even if one particular company is willing to pay
more for the opportunity.' Poor service at a National Park does not
redound to the government's best interest, even if the concessionaire
is paying for the lease at a premium price. The government may
therefore select a lessee that does not pay the most for the lease.
The government has also long manifested interest in the type
of programs radio stations broadcast. 1 The government awards
licenses only after determining which applicant would best serve the
public interest based on several factors, including the type of pro-
gramming and community contacts.62 Whatever method of allocating
licenses the government uses, therefore, may include consideration for
the content of the service to be provided by the licensee. Because of
the government's interest in how its assets are managed, a sale of
some governmental assets may resemble a contracting-out decision
more than a traditional sale in the private sector.
Programmatic interests can also be unrelated to the specific
asset being auctioned or leased. For instance, in the McKinney
Homeless Assistance Act, Congress awarded a preference for groups
purchasing vacated military bases if they provided housing for the
59. It might be prudent for government to divest its assets slowly to maximize return
because flooding the market might depress prices radically.
60. See Stephen Sloan Marine Corp., 89-1 Comp. Gen. 435 (1989) ("[Oonsiderations of
the revenue to the government generated by franchise fees... shall be subordinate to the
objective of protecting and preserving the areas and of providing adequate and appropriate
services for visitors at reasonable rates."). See generally George Cameron Coggins & Robert L.
Glicksman, Concessions Law and Policy in the National Park System, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 729,
744-46 (1997) (describing how the National Park Service makes lease decisions based upon a
variety of factors including the experience of the offeror, its financial capability, and its ability
to serve visitors well).
61. There may be a programmatic concern in the recent auction for personal
communications devices: some fear that too high of a purchase price will blunt companies' tech-
nological innovation. For a helpful analysis, see Howard A. Shelanski, Video Competition and
the Public-Interest Debate (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Vanderbilt Law
Review). On the general benefits of privatization, see Roger F. Durant et al., People, Profits,
and Service Delivery: Lessons from the Privatization of British Telecom, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 117
(1998).
62. See generally Matthew L. Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice Processes: An Application of
Public Choice Theory to Bakke, the FCC, and the Courts, 88 YALE L.J. 717, 732-36 (1979)
(discussing the FCC's initial broadcast licensing hearing process as a multicriteria choice
process).
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homeless.63 Congress seized upon the obsolescence of defense bases as
an opportunity to further a goal unconnected to defense spending-
helping the homeless. Similarly, under an 1872 Mining Law, any
individual or corporation engaged in mining significant mineral
deposits on federal land can buy the land for between $2.50 and $5 an
acre." The statute declares that "all valuable mineral deposits in
lands belonging to the United States... shall be free and open to
exploration and purchase, and the lands in which they are found to
occupation and purchase.... .65 Congress evidently fashioned the law
to encourage internal migration west and to aid the mining industry.66
3. Distributional Goals
The government also seeks distributional goals in selling and
leasing assets.67 The recent FCC auctions provide an example. Con-
gress feared that, if broadcast spectrum were allocated merely by
auction, only large companies whose management structure excluded
women and minority groups would hold the licenses for paging and
personal communications devices.68 Thus, the FCC created a series of
preferences for minorities and women to facilitate their participation
in this sector of the economy. In an early series of auctions,
companies that were predominantly owned by minorities or women
received a forty percent credit in bidding on the licenses for
information technology systems. 9 Such preferences in bidding may
63. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11411-11412 (1994). Congress has more recently limited that
preference to other federal property that is no longer being used. Preferences for visually
impaired persons to operate vending facilities on government property still exist. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 107-107f (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
64. See An Act to promote the Development of the mining Resources of the United States
§ 11, 17 Stat. 91, 94-95 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 37 (1994)). The government uses its
assets to support state laws also for programmatic purposes, such as fostering education.
65. 30 U.S.C. §22 (codifying section 1 of Mining Law of 1872).
66. See Carl J. Mayer, Comment, The 1872 Mining Law: Historical Origins of the
Discovery Rule, 53 U. CH. L. REV. 624, 648 (1986). The procedures utilized by the government
to attain such programmatic goals may or may not be efficient. For instance, the FCC's time
consuming comparative hearings into the nature of the planned programming have long been
criticized. See Spitzer, supra note 62, at 731.
67. The parallel with government loan programs to support veterans and farmers is
apparent. Subsidized loans constitute a closely related context in which the government
disposes of its assets for non profit-maximizing reasons.
68. See 47 U.S.C. § 309G)(3)(B) (1994).
69. For the FCC's perspective on its efforts to facilitate participation by companies owned
by minorities and women, see FCC REPORT, supra note 2, at 27-28. See also Kurt A. Wimmer &
Lee J. Tiedrich, Competitive Bidding & Personal Communications Services: A New Paradigm for
Fee Licensing, 3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 17, 25 (1994).
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not cause as much financial loss as first thought.° Yet, deciding upon
the qualifications of the so-termed designated entities breeds conten-
tiousness, as in other programs, and some restraint on transfer is
required to preserve the distributional goals. Analogous preferences
have been under heavy fire in the government contracts context,71
prompting the FCC to suspend and then rescind the preference
program.'
The government has pursued other distributional goals. For
instance, the government rewarded and enticed soldiers with grants
of approximately sixty-one million acres after the Revolutionary War,
the War of 1812, and the Mexican War.73 Through sales and leases of
assets, the government can therefore attain a number of distribu-
tional goals. 4
4. Social Preservation Goals
In distributing government assets, the government may also
hope to attain what might be termed social preservation goals. In the
FCC auctions, for instance, Congress granted preferences not only to
women and minorities, but also to small businesses. Continued
grazing rights on federal land, which have been set at less than one-
fourth the market rate,5 similarly may be seen to as a way (though
perhaps myopic) to protect the lifestyle of small ranchers. The con-
gressional Homestead Act promising 160 acres to any citizen who
cultivated the land provides another example.76 Subsidization of
70. A bidding credit may stimulate competition in the auction if inadequate competition
otherwise exists. See Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How
Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition, 48 STAN. L. REV. 761, 766 (1996).
Nonetheless, credits to designated entities may ensure that some awards end up in the hands of
entities with lower reservation prices. If such firms are less efficient, as the lower reservation
price may indicate, then the government will ultimately reap less tax revenue later on. In other
words, even if awarding credits stimulates competition in contexts in which competition would
otherwise be thin, the overall efficiency gains may be questionable.
71. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that all
racial classifications must be reviewed under strict scrutiny).
72. See In the Matter of Implementation of Section 309(J) of the Communications Act-
Competitive Bidding, Sixth Report and Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 136 (1995). The rescission has been
upheld by the D.C. Circuit. See Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620, 633-34 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
73. See LEHMANN, supra note 35, at 35.
74. See Gates, supra note 36, at 38. Land grants have been used to accomplish other
social goals as well, particularly to foster education within the states. See id. at 40-41. The
government has also subsidized electricity for users in certain rural areas. See Southerland,
supra note 23, at A17. Users have protested the government's proposal to sell electricity plants
because the subsidy would be removed.
75. See WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 81.
76. See Gates, supra note 36, at 42 (discussing the Homestead Act of 1862).
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water rights in various locales may serve an analogous function."
Indeed, the government may on occasion sell too much of an asset-as
with below market timber sales" 8-in order to attempt to preserve a
way of life.
Finally, in contrast to the norm in the private sector, the gov-
ernment retains a financial interest in the identity of the individual
or group using the public asset, whether the disposition stemmed
from economic, programmatic, distributive, or social preservationist
reasons. To the extent the individual or firm uses the asset more
efficiently, the national economy benefits. And from a more narrow
perspective, the government stands to benefit if the firm deploys the
asset wisely, which presumably would lead to greater tax revenue.
B. Weaknesses of Existing Disposition Schemes
So far, we have suggested that policy goals distinguish the
government from actors in the private sector when selling or leasing
assets.79 Monitoring government disposition of assets may be more
problematic than in the private sector for two reasons. First, even for
market-based transactions, no analogue to shareholder constraints
exist." Collective action problems make the prospect of monitoring
government disposition of assets by the electorate unlikely, at best.
Few citizens were aware of the government's use of lotteries to assign
on-shore oil rights, or of the intricacies of the hardrock mining pro-
gram. Although agencies may benefit the more they realize from each
sale, there is no mechanism available comparable to the discipline of
the market. The very procedures utilized by agencies in attempting to
maximize return on asset value may be inefficient.
77. See 3 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW § 213.01-.05 (1996); WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 247-59.
78. See Gary D. Libecap, Bureaucratic Issues and Environmental Concerns: A Review of
the History of Federal Land Ownership and Management, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 467, 484
(1992). Timber sales from national forests provide the economic livelihood of small towns
traditionally dependent on logging industries. See WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 114.
79. The federal government currently has scores of procedures-statutory and
administratively created-to pursue such goals. Each agency disposes of used government
property, and many as well oversee the sale or lease of countless other assets. In disposing of
government assets, agencies at times have deployed auctions, entered into leases with and
without royalties, held lotteries, distributed assets on a first come, first served basis, and
utilized ad hoc procedures in making the asset disposition decision.
80. When a private corporation disposes of assets, monitoring does not prove that
intractable. The market exerts a potent check on managers selling assets in the private sector.
A company's net worth turns in part on the income generated from the sale of such assets, and
the price of shares reflects that worth.
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Second, in light of the government objectives other than profit-
maximization, evaluation of the government's performance is more
difficult. Aside from problems of rent-seeking, there is no measure by
which to gauge the importance of the 1872 Mining Law in encour-
aging individuals to develop mining on federal land or of the grazing
subsidy to ranching. The methodologies used in pursuing such goals
may add substantial hidden costs.
In this section, we analyze three prominent government pro-
grams disposing of government assets-the 1872 Mining Law, grazing
fees, and auction for electromagnetic spectrum-to assess the efficacy
of the current regulatory system for both structuring and monitoring
government disposition efforts. In all of the programs, some effort
has been made to ensure a satisfactory return on the government's
assets, and the programs pursue other objectives-programmatic,
distributive, and social preservationist-as well. But the departures
from profit maximization are nonetheless striking, and there is reason
to question not only how well those other objectives are being accom-
plished, but also whether such objectives justify the lack of return to
public coffers. Taken together, these three examples demonstrate the
need for revamping oversight of the government disposition programs.
1. 1872 Mining Law
Mining commenced almost immediately upon colonization of
the New World by European settlers. In this country, the first
successful mining operations focused on coal and lead, with consider-
able lead mining in Wisconsin, Illinois, and Missouri.81 In the early
nineteenth century, royalties were collected in part by controlling the
lead smelting business-licensed smelters agreed to record the
amount smelted for each miner.82 The government experimented with
different procedural mechanisms to monitor the royalty system, with
varying degrees of success.83 With the Gold Rush of 1849, mining
occupied a more prominent place in the American economy.
California's population ballooned from 14,000 in 1848 to 223,000 in
1852.84 Mining for gold and other minerals extended into Nevada,
81. See MAYER & RILEY, supra note 50, at 21; see also MANAGEMENT OF FUEL, supra note
52, at 80.
82. See MAYER & RILEY, supra note 50, at 22-23. As the program became more corrupt
and controversial, Congress switched paths and authorized sale of the lead mines in 1846. See
id. at 37.
83. See id. at 32-33.
84. See WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 35.
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Montana, and Idaho, where miners constituted approximately one-
third of the population in those areas by the mid-1860s.85
To support the mining efforts, and possibly to encourage inter-
nal migration west, Congress provided that any "valuable!' minerals
found on federal land would practically be free for the taking. In a
series of statutes culminating in the 1872 Act, which still governs
today, Congress provided that no royalties need be paid for minerals
extracted from the public lands.86 A claim can be maintained with
$100 of work per year,87 and with only $500 of work, a miner (or
corporation) can buy the land outright (assuming a valuable mineral
deposit exists) at prices between $2.50 and $5.00 an acre.88 The same
law today governs hardrock minerals such as gold, silver, copper, and
uranium."' The law grants right of access to approximately 750 mil-
lion acres, or roughly one-third the territory of the entire nation.'
From a financial perspective, the law may initially have had
success in attracting miners throughout the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries to help the nation develop an industrial base, but
85. The miners fashioned rules to govern themselves, in part based on rules from mining
camps in the East, in part on Spanish rules, and in part on local custom. Contemporary
historical accounts have suggested that the rules were amazingly successful in keeping the
peace. See, e.g., CHARLES SHINN, MINING CAMPs: A STUDY IN AMERICAN FRONTIER GOVERNMENT
(1884). Congress lent the local customs the sanction of federal law shortly after the Civil War.
See An Act granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public Lands, and for
other Purposes § 1, 14 Stat. 251, 251 (1866). In Jennison v. Kirk, the Supreme Court explained:
Wherever [the miners] went, they carried with them that love of order and system and
of fair dealing which are the prominent characteristics of our people. In every district
which they occupied they framed certain rules for their government .... These rules
bore a marked similarity... [a]nd they were so framed as to secure to all comers, within
practicable limits, absolute equality of right and privilege.... Nothing but such equality
would have been tolerated by the miners, who were emphatically the law-makers, as
respects mining, upon the public lands ....
Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457 (1878).
86. See WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 44.
87. The Act has since been modified. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-66, Tit. X, Subtit. B, 107 Stat. 312, 405 (1993) (amending 30 U.S.C. § 28()-(k)).
88. The $5.00 price is for lode claims, and the $2.50 price is for placer claims. See 30
U.S.C. §§ 29, 37 (1994). Each claim is limited to twenty acres, but there is no limit on the
number of claims each person or entity can file. See id. §§ 23, 35. The purchasers receive a
patent, which is ownership in fee simple.
89. Id. § 21a.
90. See Mayer, supra note 66, at 625 n.4. Some public land, such as that obtained through
eminent domain, is exempted. See MANAGEMENT OF FUEL, supra note 52, at 82 n.3. The
President has also exercised the authority to remove particular wilderness lands or other
valuable lands from the public domain to prevent mineral exploration. See, e.g., United States
v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) (upholding President Roosevelt's withdrawal of lands to
preserve oil supply); Pathfinder Mines Corp. v. Hodel, 811 F.2d 1288, 1291-93 (9th Cir. 1987)
(upholding withdrawal of lands in Grand Canyon National Game Preserve by the Department of
Interior).
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today the law has three prominent financial weaknesses. First and
most obviously, private parties extract huge benefits at the expense of
the public at large. Three million acres have been "sold" to private
entities under the Mining Law, and countless billions of dollars made
by mining interests. 1 To provide one recent example, American
Barrick Resources Corporation of Canada in 1994 purchased 1950
acres in Nevada for under $10,000. The potential value of the gold
situated beneath the land exceeds three billion dollars.92 Unlike other
programs to develop minerals on public land,93 no means-except
taxation on profits-is employed to share the private entity's profits.
Second, there are significant collateral costs to mining enter-
prises that have saddled the public with additional obligations. In
mining for hardrock minerals, often the land is stripped, nearby
streams polluted, and the water table damaged.9 4 Although environ-
mental controls have increased in recent years,99 there is no formal
mechanism to force mining interests to internalize the costs of their
operations. Thus the federal government not only foregoes income on
the minerals, but it also subsidizes private miners whose mining
leaves the public with environmental damage.96 Moreover, permitting
such claims clouds the government's title to land in a sporadic fash-
ion. Should the government decide to withdraw a particular tract of
land from the public domain, or should it decide to build a military
91. See WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 49.
92. See Tom Kenworthy, A Court-Ordered "Gold Heist" Babbitt Uses Federal Land
Transfer to Urge Reform of 1872 Mining Act, WASH. POST, May 17, 1994, at A5. Similarly, 110
acres in Nevada were recently sold to a Danish company for $275. The value of the minerals
underneath has been estimated at close to one billion dollars. See Citing 1872 Law, Babbitt
Sells U.S. Land for $275, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 7, 1995, § 1, at 6. The government sold land in the
Coronado National Forest to ASARCO for $1,745 that is estimated to contain 2.9 billion dollars
worth of minerals, See Some "Bearly"Able to Mask Envy, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Jan. 7, 1996, at
67A.
93. The government receives royalties on resources such as shale and coal mined on public
land. See MANAGEMENT OF FUEL, supra note 52, at 145-47. Cf. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Southern
Ute Indian Tribe, 119 S. Ct. 1719 (1999) (holding reservation of rights in coal by U.S. does not
include coalbed methane gas).
94. See, e.g., DAVID SHERIDAN, HARD ROCK MINING ON THE PUBLIC LAND 14-15 (1977);
WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 64; George Cameron Coggins, Livestock Grazing on the Public
Lands: Lessons from the Failure of Official Conservation, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 749, 753-55 (1984-
1985).
95. See WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 64-67.
96. See id. at 30-32; MAYER & RILEY, supra note 50, at 82 (noting the criticisms concerning
the environmental effects of the old mining law). Under the current law, mining is the highest
use of the public domain, precluding competing uses, unless the Secretary of Interior withdraws
the land from mining altogether. See Lynn M. Kornfeld, Comment, Reclamation of Inactive and
Abandoned Hardrock Mine Sites: Remining and Liability Under CERCLA and the CWA, 69 U.
COLO. L. REV. 597, 597-604 (1998); Daphne Werth, Comment, Where Regulation and Property
Rights Collide: Reforming the Hardrock Act of 1872, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 427, 445 (1994).
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base, it must assess the validity of the mining claims located on the
land to determine whether compensation is owed.9 7 Given that there
are over one million unpatented claims of record, the problem is con-
siderable.98
Third, substantial inefficiencies plague the system. From a
bureaucratic perspective, the government sustains much administra-
tive cost in operating the mining laws. Before granting a patent,
officials must inspect each site to ascertain whether the claim in-
cludes a "valuable" deposit.99  That requirement has proven
problematic, with the Secretary of the Interior adopting the position
that valuable deposit means that the mineral not only exists, but can
be "extracted, removed, and marketed at a profit.''"" ° Then, before
land is sold (or the claim challenged),01' officials must ensure that
sufficient work has been devoted to the claim.
10 2
From the miners' perspective as well, the administrative struc-
ture of the Act is unfortunate. For instance, miners must devote
resources into extracting materials before they even know whether a
"valuable" deposit exists, and that term is ambiguous enough to deter
some productive efforts."3 The requirement of work assessment also
97. Cf. Kunkes v. United States, 78 F.3d 1549, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing
government's desire to remove encumbrances from unpatented claims on federal land).
98. See Michael Braunstein, Natural Environments and Natural Resources: An Economic
Analysis and New Interpretation of the General Mining Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1133, 1155-56
(1985); see also Peter Strauss, Mining Claims on Public Lands: A Study of Interior Department
Procedures, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 185, 189-90. Congress in the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 required miners for the first time to record their claims with the
federal government. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 314, 43 U.S.C. §
1744 (1994). Prior to that time, recordation was dependent upon state law.
99. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 29 (1994); see also United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 600
n.1 (1968).
100. Coleman, 390 U.S. at 600; see id. at 602-03 (upholding Secretary's interpretation as
reasonable); see also Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1905) (upholding Secretary's
prudent-man test, under which a valuable deposit must be of such a character that a person of
ordinary prudence would expend money to develop the deposit). For a discussion of the tension
between the two tests, see generally Mayer, supra note 66.
101. There has been consistent abuse of the system in which individuals have staked
claims and obtained patents in order to build vacation homes, or in order to obtain more land for
grazing. See MANAGEMENT OF FUEL, supra note 52, at 201-03. One enterprising miner staked
out a claim near the trail head of the Grand Canyon for the purpose of exacting a toll from
visitors. See Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 454-55 (1920).
102. For the pragmatic difficulties in determining how much work has been devoted to such
widely scattered claims, see MANAGEMENT OF FUEL, supra note 52, at 195-96; Strauss, supra
note 98, at 226-30. Congress has recently mandated that claimants with more than ten claims
pay $100 per claim in lieu of the assessment work. See 30 U.S.C. § 28f(a). Congress directed
that the fee be maintained through 1998. See id. The Federal Circuit has rejected a Takings
challenge to the new requirement. See Kunkes, 78 F.3d at 1554-56.
103. See MANAGEMENT OF FUEL, supra note 52, at 199; PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N,
ONE-THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 124 (1970). But see supra note 100.
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dictates that funds be spent (and the land surface disturbed) even
when not required to further the claim. It may be, for instance, that
the miners can only amass sufficient funds to mine their claims later,
but must expend money in the interim to preserve them."°
Nor do the nonmonetary objectives underlying the 1872 law
seem pressing today. We doubt that the government still is interested
in encouraging internal migration. Moreover, not only do individual
miners benefit from the law, as during the Gold Rush, but also so do
huge corporations." 5 Corporations can use individuals to aggregate
the 20-acre claims for their use. The subsidy to mining interests
seems apparent.'
Thus, even though the Mining Law of 1872 may have been
enacted with the best intentions, and may as well have been success-
ful in early years, today it is less defensible. The government fails to
maximize return on its valuable mineral assets, and the program-
matic and possibly social preservationist objectives animating the
original Act no longer serve the public interest. The Mining Law
reflects the danger of rent-seeking by organized interest groups bene-
fiting from public subsidies in the form of virtually free use of
minerals discovered on public land.
104. See Braunstein, supra note 98, at 1156-58.
105. See MAYER & RILEY, supra note 50, at 84. As an example, in addition to the Barrick
purchase, Brush Wellman is now developing mining operations for beryllium on some 2,500
acres of Utah desert, with a potential value of fifteen billion dollars. See Keith Epstein, Fortune
Hidden Under Desert, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, May 22, 1994, at Al.
106. In 1994, the Clinton Administration targeted the 1872 law for revision, hoping to end
the bonanza for mining interests, though not threatening to disturb vested rights under the
program. Interior Secretary Babbitt termed reform one of the primary goals of his stewardship
of the Interior Department. See Reform for the Public Lands, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1993, at
A14; Mark Shaffer, Throw the Bums Out: 2000 Protest Mining Bill, ARIZ. REPUBLIc, Aug. 29,
1993, at A19. Perhaps predictably, mining interests lobbied long and hard to kill the reform
bills. (State representatives have the incentive to retain the mining program because of its role
in spurring development within their jurisdictions, while the cost to the Treasury is spread
among all jurisdictions.) In contrast, those benefiting from any repeal constitute a classic
dispersed majority-taxpayers and anyone down river. Although such individuals might
certainly favor repeal and be willing to support repeal measures to some extent, they are at a
competitive disadvantage in the lobbying process both because they are less easily identified
than the mining interests, and because they have far less at stake than do the defenders of the
status quo. More surprisingly, the House came within forty-five votes of exempting one
particular mining company, Brush Wellman, from the proposed reforms that would have
required higher fees and royalties. See Epstein, supra note 105, at Al. With just an estimated
$131,336 in campaign contributions to members of Congress by Brush Wellman executives,
lobbyists, and committees, Brush Wellman was almost able to insulate itself and protect its
development from any subsequent congressional revision of the law.
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2. Grazing Fees
The federal government's policy of permitting grazing on public
lands by ranchers substantially mirrors the 1872 Mining Law. Both
policies grew out of a period in which the federal government encour-
aged internal migration west, and both arose during a period when
land in the West seemed almost boundless. Indeed, ranchers enjoyed
more of a history of free grazing on unclaimed public lands than min-
ers had in keeping proceeds of minerals discovered in the public
domain. 10 7 The federal government sanctioned use of federal land for
grazing to encourage more rapid settlement of western territories."°8
Recently, it has been estimated that over nineteen thousand ranchers
have permits covering approximately 175 million acres"--an area as
large as California, Oregon, and Washington combined."0
The federal government first imposed grazing fees on Forest
Service land in the early 1900s. Such fees were upheld by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Grimaud,"' much to the dismay of
many ranchers."' Congress amended the system of grazing rights on
all other federal land in 1934."' The Taylor Grazing Act established
grazing districts and empowered the Secretary of the Interior to make
all reasonable rules to carry out the Act's legislative purpose."' The
Act authorized the Secretary to issue permits to ranchers "upon the
payment annually of reasonable fees.""' Initial grazing fees were set
107. Spanish conquistadors evidently introduced the cattle industry in the New Mexico
Territories as early as 1598. Under Spanish and Mexican rule, landowners by custom enjoyed
the right to graze their herds on nearby land if it was owned by the government and unclaimed.
After acquisition of the territory from Mexico under the Guadelupe-Hidalgo Treaty, United
States leaders encouraged rapid settlement of the land, including access to unsurveyed
government land for grazing. Similarly, British settlers introduced cattle into the Oregon
territory in the early nineteenth century. The federal government sanctioned use of federal
land for grazing after acquiring that territory in the 1840s. See Frank J. Falen & Karen Budd-
Falen, The Right to Graze Livestock on the Federal Lands: The Historical Development of
Western Grazing Rights, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 505, 511-18 (1993-94).
108. See id. at 514.
109. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 26-28.
110. See Coggins, supra note 94, at 750-51; Todd M. Olinger, Comment, Public Rangeland
Reform: New Prospects for Collaboration and Local Control Using the Resource Advisory
Councils, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 633, 635-37 (1998). Grazing, however, does not occur in all of the
land covered by the permits in any given year. See PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, supra
note 103, at 105.
111. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 522 (1911) (upholding penalty for violation of
regulation imposing grazing fee permit requirement).
112. See WILK[INSON, supra note 30, at 92-93.
113. See Act of June 28, 1934, Pub. L. No. 482, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934) (codified as amended at
43 U.S.C. § 315-315r (1994)).
114. See 43 U.S.C. § 315a.
115. Id. § 315b.
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at a low level, and statutory preferences were accorded to existing
stock interests."' The Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") grants
permits for a ten-year period, and permit holders receive priority for
renewal."' Each permit must specify the kind and number of live-
stock and the times of year in which grazing will take place."'
Congress initiated additional reform with enactment of the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 ('FLPMA')." On a
rhetorical level, the Act made clear the federal government's intent to
retain and control the public domain. 2 ' To that end, the statute
declared the rangeland subject to multiple use management for
recreation and wildlife, as well as for livestock. 2' The Act authorized
the BLM to include additional conditions in the permit, or in an
allotment management plan incorporated in the permit.2 ' BLM offi-
cials enjoy the flexibility to alter the number of livestock or place of
grazing as the seasons unfold. Permittees, however, may now recover
for any improvements in the range should their permits be canceled.'
From a financial perspective, two critical problems confront
the grazing fee program, much as they do the Mining Law of 1872.
First, grazing rights have been set at estimates as low as one-fourth
the level of grazing rights on private land.124  The subsidy is steep,
116. See id. The losers in the legislative arena were the nomadic sheepherders who could
not establish any preexisting entitlement or preference to graze on particular land. See Coggins
& Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 36, at 55-56.
117. See Joseph M. Feller, Grazing Management on the Public Lands: Opening the Process
to Public Participation, 26 LAND & WATER L. REV. 571, 574 (1991).
118. See id.
119. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997)).
120. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) ("The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United
States that the public lands be retained in Federal ownership .... ').
121. See id. § 1701(a)(8). See S. 1459, 104th Cong. (1996), and planned revision limiting
public involvement.
122. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712.
123. The FLPMA directs the BLM to set macro land-use plans, or Resource Management
Plans, to implement the multiple use goal of the Act. The area covered typically includes over
one million acres and one hundred grazing allotments. BLM has not extensively utilized those
plans to change the nature of the grazing permit decisions. See Feller, supra note 117, at 576-
78. Moreover, the 1976 Act neither changed the structure of the permit fee process nor forced
ranchers to internalize the social cost of grazing. Congress enacted the Public Rangeland
Improvement Act in 1978, setting a fee assessment to keep the permit at below market prices.
124. See WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 81. Ranchers have at times assigned permits to
third parties for substantial gains. See George Cameron Coggins et al., The Law of Public
Rangeland Management I. The Extent and Distribution of Federal Power, 12 ENVTL. L. 535, 560
n.177 (1982).
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estimated at fifty million dollars annually.'25 Although Congress
directed the Department of the Interior that the "reasonable fee"
charged shall consist of a grazing fee for the use of the range, and a
range component fee,"2 6 the agency has chosen not to interpret the
statute as a revenue producing measure."'
Second, overgrazing of the public domain has caused severe
environmental harms. Vegetation, wildlife, and riparian zones have
all suffered."8  Officials have characterized over two-thirds of all
rangeland administered by the Department of Interior as being in fair
or poor condition.129 The problem of soil erosion is acute in many
areas." ° The federal government assumes expenses for upkeep of the
land, including application of insecticides and eradication of coyotes. 3'
One problem may be that the below-market prices reduce ranchers'
incentives to manage rangeland wisely.'3'
Although grazing on federal lands may support only two or
three percent of national foraging needs, 33 those ranchers holding
permits rely on the public lands for their livelihoods. The market
price of ranches includes the extent of grazing rights (Animal Units
per Month, or AUMs) granted by the Department of Interior's Bureau
of Land Management. Opposition to reform efforts has been fierce
and effective. An early effort to raise fees towards market levels in
the 1940s was met by heavy lobbying, culminating in Congress's
125. See supra note 75. Some have calculated lower amounts depending upon exclusion of
government indirect costs to support grazing. See Interior Department Cuts Its Grazing Fees by
30%, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1996, at A6.
126. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1753; see also id. § 315b.
127. For a history of the ranchers' control over grazing administration, see generally
CULHANE, supra note 55; PHILLIP 0. Foss, POLITIcS AND GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF
GRAZING ON THE PUBLIC DOMAINS (1960).
128. See WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 79-80.
129. See id. at 111.
130. See id. at 79-80; see also Bruce M. Pendery, Reforming Livestock Grazing on the Public
Domain: Ecosystem Management-Based Standards and Guidelines Blaze a New Path for Range
Management, 27 ENVTL. L. 513, 525-42 (1997) (describing several different models for assessing
the ecological status of rangelands). The Interior Department during the Clinton Admini-
stration promulgated regulations to help reverse the deterioration. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 1.477,
1784.0-1 to 1784.6-2, 4100.0-1 to 4180.2 (1995).
131. See Coggins, supra note 94, at 757.
132. See WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 82. In addition, there may well be inefficiencies in
the current permit system. If rainfall is less or greater than predicted in a given year, BLM
officials cannot adjust the AUMs accordingly. See LEHMANN, supra note 35, at 63. Nonetheless,
the cost to help replenish the land exceeds by many times the amount collected through grazing
fees. See Ranchers Get Last Chance to Improve Damaged Land, THE IDAHO STATESMAN, May 2,
1999, at 1OB, available in 1999 WL 15114957 (citing examples such as a $27,000 repair on
ground that brings in $400 a year in grazing fees).
133. See WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 81.
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decision to slash. the BLM's budget in half.14  In the 1980s, the so-
termed Sagebrush Rebellion sought to force the federal government to
turn over the public lands to the states.'35 Momentum for divestiture
evidently subsided only when proponents realized that the loss of
federal control might end the subsidies. Studies demonstrated that
states charged more for leasing their lands than did the federal
government.'36 More recently, western ranchers have successfully
organized to block legislative reform of the grazing fee program,
keeping the subsidy intact.3 '
The grazing preferences thus seem haphazard. A small
minority of ranchers can take advantage of below market prices, and
they unquestionably enjoy some reliance interest in the grazing per-
mits. Yet the financial drain on the Treasury is cognizable, and from
a social preservationist or distributive perspective, it is not clear why
these particular ranchers merit subsidies."'
3. FCC Electromagnetic Spectrum
In contrast to the experience in the mining and grazing fee
contexts, the federal government historically has not permitted unfet-
tered use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Because multiple uses of
the electromagnetic spectrum are incompatible, the FCC has long
134. See MAYER & RILEY, supra note 50, at 94.
135. See LEHMANN, supra note 35, at 7.
136. See, e.g., Robert H. Nelson, The Subsidized Sagebrush: Why the Privatization
Movement Failed, 8 REGULATION 20 (1984). The current movement among those opposed to
stringent government controls favors a radical sharing of power, or "wise use" of the land, with
most influence to be exerted by municipalities in which the federal government's land lies. See
Marianne Lavelle, "Wise-Use" Movement Grows: Activist Counties Battle the Federal
Government Over Land-Use Controls, NAT'L L.J., June 5, 1995, at Al. The wise use movement
favors congressional enactment of "measures which recognize that private parties legitimately
own possessory rights to timber contracts, mining claims, water rights, grazing permits and
other claims." THE WISE-USE AGENDA 14 (Alan D. Gottlieb ed., 1989).
137. Although reform had been a centerpiece of Secretary Babbitt's legislative agenda,
Republic Senators from the West spearheaded an effort to thwart reform. See, e.g., Adam
Clymer, Rancor Leaves Its Mark on 103d Congress: Senate Passes Desert Bill, After G.O.P.'s
28th Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1994, at Al; Charles Siebert, Toxic, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July
5, 1998, at 16.
138. The Department of the Interior, in fact, has arguably diverged from the congressional
directive by setting low fees and failing to take steps to improve the condition of the rangeland.
Congress might, however, benefit from the agency's seeming reluctance to manage the
rangeland aggressively. Congress can distance itself from the result while still reaping rewards
in the forms of enhanced contributions from those affected. See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD,
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION
(1993). Indeed, Congress's failure to raise the fees, despite the efforts of Interior Secretary
Babbitt, among others, suggests Congress's agreement with the agency's preference for the
status quo.
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limited use of that spectrum. Under the Communications Act of 1934,
the FCC determined allocation of the electromagnetic spectrum for
broadcasting on the basis of so-termed comparative hearings as to
which application would best serve "the public interest, convenience,
and necessity," and no fees were charged.139 Factors utilized by the
Commission in awarding licenses for radio and television stations
have included diversification of media control, efficient spectrum use,
past broadcast record, proposed programming, financial capability,
participation in management by station owners, and minority
ownership. " °
Comparative hearings suffered from a number of drawbacks.
First, they were costly, both in terms of resources and time. As the
hearings dragged on, the date upon which service could be provided to
the public was pushed further back.141 The FCC also determined that,
in terms of the number of hearings required, the preparation needed,
and the agency personnel time absorbed, the hearings were exces-
sively expensive."'
Second, use of the comparative hearings was normatively
questionable. The FCC's ability to determine the best broadcasting
for the public was debatable, at best. Even if the agency could make
such a call, it may have lacked the power to predict the service that
applicants would ultimately provide from the comparative hearings.
The open-ended nature of the criteria arguably led to imposition of
personal preferences by the Commissioners."'
Responding to the criticisms, Congress in 1981 directed the
FCC to consider awarding licenses through use of a lottery system.
144
The lottery system succeeded in avoiding some of the bureaucratic
delay built into the comparative hearings process. " Yet, lotteries
drew fire for precipitating a secondary auction. 146 Lottery winners-
who oftentimes had no connection to the communications business-
139. See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 328-30 (1945).
140. ; See Spitzer, supra note 62, at 734-35; see also William L. Fishman, Property Rights,
Reliance, and Retroactivity Under the Communications Act of 1934, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 27
(1997) (arguing that FCC decision to limit alienability of licenses is economically inefficient). See
generally Wimmer & Tiedrich, supra note 69.
141. See FCC REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-7. For example, there were over two hundred
requests for the first thirty licenses, and completing the required hearing delayed awards by two
years. See id. at 5.
142. See id. at 8.
143. See Spitzer, supra note 62, at 750.
144. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
145. See Wimmer & Tiedrich, supra note 69, at 18.
146. See id.
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sold their right to broadcast in the open market, reaping windfalls at
the expense of the public at large.147
Congress in 1993 authorized the FCC to use auctions in allo-
cating use of the electromagnetic spectrum, at least for uses other
than broadcasting.148 Administratively, the FCC determined which
use each part of the spectrum could be devoted to, such as digital
television ("ATV) for certain bands, paging services for others, etc. In
making these decisions, Congress directed the FCC to consider public
interest factors other than maximizing revenue."4
The auctions have dramatically altered the way many licenses
will be granted. To a large extent, the market-and not the FCC or
chance-determines who is to hold a license. Firms that value use of
the spectrum most presumably will offer the most for the license.15
The goals of providing the best service to the public and allocating the
license to those entities valuing them most should overlap, if not
converge. And, unlike with comparative hearings and lotteries,
license holders compensate the public for the valuable commodity
they use. The money generated through the auctions has exceeded
expectations, with almost twenty-three billion dollars generated for
the Treasury in a three-year period. 5'
So far, the auctions can be termed a success story in maxi-
mizing return for the government's regulatory assets. The FCC's
design and implementation of the auction system can and should be of
great aid to other agencies seeking to generate income from the sale
or lease of government assets. 5' Indeed, other nations have sought to
utilize the FCC innovations-such as the multi-round format-in
structuring their auctions.'53
But the revenue limitations of the auctions are informative as
well.'54 First, the FCC made the critical judgment prior to the auc-
tions as to which portion of the spectrum to allocate to which commu-
nications service. For example, the FCC allocated television broad-
147. See, e.g., Gregory L. Rosston & Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based Spectrum
Policy to Promote the Public Interest, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 87, 107 (1997).
148. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j).
149. See id. § 309(j)(7)(B).
150. Of course, mistakes can be made in valuation (such as the so-termed winner's curse),
and default rates have been high. See supra note 53.
151. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
152. See FCC REPORT, supra note 2, at 16-25.
153. Mexico has deployed the copyrighted system, and other countries, such as Canada,
Guatemala, and Argentina, have expressed interest. See id. at 19.
154. In addition, the design of the C-block auction-which led to numerous defaults-may
well have been faulty. See supra note 53.
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casting to one particular band width (54-806 MHz), cellular
communications to another width (824-849 and 869-894 MHz), and
personal communication services yet to another band (1850-1990
MHz).
The FCC allocation decision may well have prevented even
greater return on the government's assets. Applicants bid for licenses
to provide specific services rather than for the opportunity to imple-
ment some service of their choice on part of the spectrum. For
example, if the FCC had auctioned off blocks of spectrum, a winning
bidder could have decided whether to use that block for television,
personal communications devices, or for cellular communications.
Licensees then would have been able to provide the services that the
market valued most highly, which would vary according to geography,
company technology, and the like. In that way, the government could
well have obtained far more from the auctions."'
Second, in developing rules to operate the auction, the FCC
decided to award what is termed a "pioneer preference" to reward
technological innovation. Under the former comparative hearings and
lottery systems, companies disclosed their innovations in public appli-
cations, but they did not necessarily receive licenses due either to
evaluation under the multi-factor inquiry in the comparative hear-
ings, or to the luck involved in the lottery system. Once disclosed,
however, competitors could gain the benefits from the losing
company's innovations at no cost because of the public disclosure. To
remove this potential damper on innovation, the FCC in 1991 created
the pioneer preference program designed to accord a "preference" in
the application process to any applicant that "has developed an inno-
vative proposal that leads to the establishment of a service not
currently provided or a substantial enhancement of an existing
service."'' 6 Under the system of comparative hearings and lotteries,
155. See Use of the Radio Spectrum: Hearing on S. 652 and H.R. 1555 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Henry
Geller, Communications Fellow at Markle Foundation); Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A
Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 210-11, 242-44 (1982);
Howard A. Shelanski & Peter W. Huber, Administrative Creation of Property Rights to Radio
Spectrum, 41 J.L. & ECON. 581, 596 (1998) (relating that the opportunity costs of preventing
licensees to convert spectrum use to different purposes likely exceed several hundred million
dollars). Criticisms of the auction tack certainly exist. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, The
Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 171-75 (1990)
(arguing for property rights model); Glen 0. Robinson, The "New" Communications Act: A
Second Opinion, 29 CONN. L. REV. 289, 297-98 (1996) (arguing that concerns for efficient,
flexible use of spectrum does not necessarily point in the direction of auctions as an allocation
method).
156. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.402(a) (1996).
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those receiving preferences were exempt from the typical licensing
track and guaranteed a license so long as they were otherwise
qualified.'57 The FCC, although split internally,'58 initially determined
that three of the one hundred applicants merited preferences for
licenses of broadband personal communications services.
The congressional authorization for auctions, however, forced
the FCC to reassess its initial decision with respect to preferences.
The statute directed the Commission to pursue the objectives of "pro-
moting.., competition [and] efficient and intensive use of the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum."159 In sanctioning auctions, Congress also
authorized the agency to continue or disband the pioneer preference
program, as it saw fit. 6° Accordingly, the agency convened a new
rulemaking to consider the issue. The FCC determined that, despite
the move to auctions for the rest of the applicants for broadband
personal communication services, the three entities awarded prefer-
ences would receive licenses for free. Those licenses covered three of
the most important markets in the country, together constituting
twenty-five percent of the United States' population. 6' The estimated
value of the three licenses was placed somewhere between one-half
and one and one-half billion dollars.6 After considerable protest (and
litigation), the FCC reconsidered its decision to award the three
companies free licenses, and instead guaranteed the three companies
licenses for three years if they agreed to pay a certain percentage
(roughly 80-95 percent) of market value.'63 Congress subsequently
changed the discount to eighty-five percent for those three firms
accorded the preferences and precluded judicial review of the award."M
157. See id.
158. See the statements issued by Commissioner Barret and Commissioner Dugan in In re
Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules to Establish New Personal Communications Servs., 7
F.C.C.R. 7794 (1992), lamenting the "hairsplitting" inquiry into which company warranted the
pioneer preference.
159. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997).
160. See id. § 309(j)(6)(G) (stating that the amendment should not be construed as
prohibiting the agency "from awarding licenses to those persons who make significant
contributions to the development of a new telecommunications service or technology').
161. The three licenses covered the Baltimore-Washington, D.C. area awarded to American
Personal Communications, a venture funded principally by the Washington Post Co., the Los
Angeles area (awarded to Cox Enterprises), and the New York City area (awarded to Omnipoint
Communications).
162. See With Millions at Stake, Dingell Launches PCS Preference Inquiry, FCC REP., May
19, 1994.
163. See 59 Fed. Reg. 42,521 (1994). The percentage was based on valuation per person
living in the markets.
164. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 801, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 5051
(1994). The three parties may well have obtained congressional sanction for the preference in
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Under the new auctions, however, the efficacy of a pioneer
preference is debatable. The new auction method, unlike the com-
parative hearing and lottery methodologies, will probably not deter
innovation. Companies' innovation should determine the value of the
licenses to those companies. Thus, the license should be worth more
to an entity with the most advanced technology.'65 Moreover, the
Commission's decision to guarantee the innovators new licenses, as
opposed to granting them a credit in bidding on the licenses, arguably
lacks justification. Thus, in three of the ten largest markets in the
nation, there was no competitive bidding,166 and the government may
have squandered hundreds of millions of dollars.
Congress's subsequent decision in 1996 to forego auctioning
spectrum worth an estimated 15-70 billion dollars was far more egre-
gious. 167 To create an incentive for the broadcast industry to develop
digital television, Congress gave to each existing television station one
additional channel that could be digitalized to spur development of
the more sophisticated technology.168 Instead of auctioning off such
spectrum and then permitting market forces to allocate the spectrum
according to public demand, Congress assigned the spectrum to the
broadcast industry for a period of some years so that the television
stations would offer the sharper digital programming alongside their
current analog offering. After a transitional period, the statute envi-
sioned that the broadcasting networks would return the analog spec-
trum to the FCC for further deployment.'69
The failure to adhere to a market paradigm for allocating the
spectrum is startling. Former Senator Bob Dole called it a "giant
corporate welfare program," and William Safire termed it a "ripoff on
return for the communications giants' efforts to facilitate passage of GATT. The fact that the
preclusion provision was inserted into a trade agreement is itself highly suggestive. See
William Glaberson, A dispute over GATT highlights the complex links between newspapers and
their corporate parents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1994, at D7. See generally 140 CONG. REC. S15077-
01 (daily ed.. Nov. 30, 1994).
165. The FCC has reconsidered whether to award pioneer preferences in future auctions.
See FCC Modifies Pioneer's Preference Program in Accordance with GATT, PCS NEWS, Mar. 8,
1995, available in 1995 WL 7327248.
166. Moreover, those companies afforded the preferences received a jump on the
competition by starting to build personal communications structures before the auction. See
GSM Operators' Welcome First Ever U.S. Member, FIN. TIMES LIMITED, June 15, 1995.
167. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 905, 938-43 (1997) (criticizing Congress for the spectrum giveaway); Edmund L.
Andrews, Digital TV, Dollars and Dissent: The Political Battle Grows Over the Use of New
Broadcast Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1996, at D1.
168. See 47 U.S.C. § 336(a) (Supp. I1 1997); see also Joel Brinkley, Congress Asks FCC to
Begin Lending Channels for Digital TVBroadcasts, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1996, at D6.
169. See Paul Taylor, Superhighway Robbery, NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 20.
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a scale vaster than dreamed of by yesteryear's robber barons."17 No
sound reason exists to think that broadcasters lacked the incentive to
develop high definition television if they thought it would be profit-
able. The public interest in ensuring rapid development of high defi-
nition television per se is elusive. And, if the market did not favor
such initiatives, then the spectrum could have been allocated to other
purposes. The congressional action reeks of special interest
influence. 7'
Indeed, after receiving the free spectrum, the broadcast net-
works have started to back away from their pledge of developing high
definition television as a priority. Networks determined that each
digitalized channel they received for free could be redivided into six
analog channels, or into several analog channels with additional space
for better television reception or paging devices left over.' They
argued that using the spectrum for more than just digital television
would benefit the public, not to mention bring them more profit.173
The networks found pliable allies in Congress and the FCC.174
Congress already has relaxed the requirements set in the 1996 Act,
minimizing the percentage of the donated spectrum that must be
dedicated to digital programming, and delaying the date by which
broadcasters must return the spectrum on which they had previously
presented analog programming.'75 The recent FCC ruling calls into
question the original congressional decisions to give away the spec-
trum in the first instance.
The FCC auction success story is thus not unblemished.
Although the move to a market-based system of allocation should be
lauded, the pioneer preference program and HDTV giveaway manifest
the same dangers of inefficiency and rent-seeking that have affected
170. Id.
171. See id. (explaining legislation by virtue of interest group lobbying as well as the
control local broadcasters exert over incumbents seeking reelection); Neil Hickey, What's at
stake in the spectrum war? Only billions of dollars and the future of television, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., July 17, 1996, at 39, available in 1996 WL 8772666.
172. See, e.g., David Hatch, Broadcasters Yielding on HDTV, CRAIN COMM., Sept. 22, 1997,
at 1; Romesh Ratnesar, A Bandwidth Bonanza: How the networks plan to make even more from
a $70 billion handout, TIME, Sept. 1, 1997, at 60; Sean Somerville, Sinclair to shun high
definition TVfor channels, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 17, 1997, at 1D.
173. See 62 Fed. Reg. 26,966, 26,972 (1997). See generally 47 C.F.R. pt. 73 (1998) (regu-
lating Radio Broadcast Services).
174. See also Hearing on Digital Television Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transp., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Reed E. Hundt, chairman of the FCC)
(addressing broadcasters' qualified right to decide how to use additional spectrum).
175. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997 § 3002, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 11 Stat. 251, 259 (1997).
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other agency disposition programs. Successful auctions only highlight
the profligacy of related aspects of telecommunications regulation.
These three examples-mining claims, grazing rights, and
allocation of electromagnetic spectrum-only scratch the surface of
the myriad disposition programs administered by the government.176
Each program furthers distinct goals and utilizes different method-
ology. But the programs illustrate that no checks analogous to
market discipline constrain government disposition efforts. The
congressional schemes do not direct agencies to seek maximum return
on public assets, and interest groups have evidently obtained benefits
from Congress and government agencies through use of government
resources at below-market prices. The public has not been well in-
formed of such agency disposition efforts and cannot, in any event,
gauge the results of agency performance in the business section of the
newspaper.
176. Other examples of agency disposition policies that diverge from Congress's direction
exist. For instance, the Forest Service has long conducted below-market timber sales in the
National Forests, despite Congress's direction in the National Forest Management Act, that the
Service is to balance revenue with recreation and wildlife concerns. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)
(1994). See also WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 137-69; Libecap, supra note 78, at 484. The
General Accounting Office ("GAO") reported that the Forest Service lost almost one billion
dollars in cutting timber between 1992 and 1995. See Report Shows Logging Program Costly,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 3, 1995, § 1, at 8; see also Mark C. Phares, Below-Cost Timber Sales: Perspective
Based on Thirty Years of Environmental Legislation, 12 PUB. LAND L. REV. 59, 79 (1991)
(concluding that "a commitment by the Forest Service to protect all resources and cease being so
conscious of the timber resource" provides the best solution to the problem); Timber road ripoff,
SEATTLE TIMES, June 15, 1998, at B4 (relating that U.S. Forest Service acknowledged losing
more than $88 million in timber sales the previous year). The Forest Service keeps part of the
sales for its own use, and funds logging roads from a separate budget. See Phares, supra, at 63-
64 (discussing the Forest Service's use of funds to build roadways); Timber Industry Should Pay
for Logging Roads, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 13, 1997, at B6 (Forest Service subsidized logging
industry by paying $245 million for roads from 1992 to 1994). Thus, the greater the timber
yield-even when not cost effective-the more the agency can keep. The Forest Service
therefore has insufficient incentive to cut timber only when it is financially prudent to do so,
even without considering the incommensurable environmental values threatened by its
activities. Cf. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAuCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1971) (developing the thesis that agencies strive to maximize their own jurisdiction and
wealth); see generally RANDAL O'TOOLE, REFORMING THE FOREST SERVICE (1988). For another
example, the Bureau of Reclamation has evidently undercharged consumers and municipalities
in the West for their use of government-furnished water. See generally COGGINS & GLICKSMAN,
supra note 77, § 21.04; Hamilton Candee, The Broken Promise of Reclamation Reform, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 657 (1989); Paul S. Taylor, Excess Land Law: Calculated Circumvention, 52 CAL.
L. REV. 978 (1964); Todd G. Glass, Comment, The 1992 Omnibus Water Act: Three Rubrics of
Reclamation Reform, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143 (1995).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
III. POLITICAL AND LEGAL OBSTACLES TO REFORM OF
GOVERNMENTAL DISPOSITION PROGRAMS
In this part we explore why both political checks and legal
controls have failed to reform property dispositions undertaken by
federal agencies. Classic forms of monitoring the political branches
and administrative agencies have proven to be inadequate for two
related reasons. First, there has been a failure in conceptualization.
Policymakers and scholars routinely conceptualized most property
disposition schemes as distinctly unique actions of sovereignty. Most
importantly, they have failed to integrate this area of government
activity into more general schemes for controlling and monitoring
government agency activity. Second, this neglect and failure in con-
ceptualization only exacerbated structural and institutional barriers
to political reform. In other words, given that government property
disposition schemes were largely conceptualized as beyond the scope
of legal mechanisms for monitoring, it only further legitimized the
political trades that marked the disposition process. Indeed, as we
discuss below, the failure of conceptualization left in place a political
process that virtually assured distortions in results and informational
flow to the public.
A. The Structural and Institutional Barriers to Political Reform
In a multitude of federal government property schemes special
interest groups dominate the political process. The few benefit at the
expense of the majority. Majority rule obviously does not control.
Therefore, at the first level of analysis it is necessary to examine
whether formidable collective action problems stand as barriers to
political reform.
At the theoretical level it is well understood that collective
action problems infect political markets.177 These collective action
dynamics advantage smaller groups with focused, narrow interests in
the legislative process. The shared agenda, smaller size, and distri-
bution of meaningful benefits eases the tasks of organizing, ensuring
group commitment, and punishing defectors or free riders. In other
words, the structural attributes of these groups allow them to more
177. The vast literature is discussed and extensively critiqued in Steven P. Croley, Theories
of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34-55 (1998). The
classic work on the economics of group formation is MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
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easily solve free rider problems.178 By contrast, the larger diffuse
groups will face serious organizational hurdles. Their size signifi-
cantly increases the costs of communication, strategizing, and
policing. Moreover, the great size of the group may make benefits
quite small, particularly in comparison to the costs of participating.'79
Consider the configuration of groups posed by the FCC's early
efforts at regulation of broadcasting."8 Major networks and broad-
casters were able to dominate the lawmaking process and, most
importantly garner the returns produced by the free use of the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum. Obviously the broadcasting interests faced
few obstacles in organizing and formulating lobbying strategies in
Congress or the FCC. 8' Defections were easily detected and the bene-
fits of group cohesion were large and easily distributed. In sharp
contrast, the fiscal losers-the public at large who lost revenues by
giving away the spectrum for free-had little incentive to organize.
An individual's cost in lost revenue was far too small to make it
worthwhile to resist the giveaway. And any efforts undertaken by
individual citizens would redound to the benefit of others who did not
participate. 8'
Of course, these theoretical predictions of group formation and
lobbying are controversial and sometimes contradicted by the data.183
For example, in broadcasting, public interest groups formed, chal-
lenging established interests and the FCC.'84 Whether these groups
were able to deploy equal resources was always doubtful.8 More
significantly, however, the reforms sought by these more diffuse pub-
178. See OLSON, supra note 177, at 28-29; see also Croley, supra note 177, at 13-22
(describing Olson's theory as well as those who built upon it).
179. See OLSON, supra note 177, at 28-29, 35.
180. For an early critique highlighting the anticompetitive character of telecommunications
regulation, see generally R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON.
1 (1959).
181. An early history tracing broadcasting dominance is LAWRENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE
FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION: ITS HISTORY, ACTnITIES, AND ORGANIZATION (1932). A more
recent account can be found in Charles R. Shipan, Interest Groups, Judicial Review, and the
Origins of Broadcast Regulation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 549, 567 (1997).
182. Public interest groups did arise to attempt to combat the power of the broadcasting
interests, yet their success was almost nonexistent. See Hazlett, supra note 155, at 154.
183. See Croley, supra note 177, at 19 (noting that "[E]xamples even of large lobbying
groups are easy to fiid.'); id. at 49-50 ("Mhe collective action problem, upon which the public
choice theory is built, introduces conceptual indeterminacy into the theory. Whether larger or
smaller groups will enjoy a competitive advantage in the market for regulation.., is simply not
clear apriori.'). A full account of the rise and influence of different interest groups can be found
in KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1986).
184. See Shipan, supra note 181, at 567.
185. See id. at 567-68.
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lic interest groups were problematic if not counter-productive to real
reform. Public interest groups often accepted as given the departure
from market-based solutions-indeed, on occasion pressing for even
stronger nonmarket proposals at times including extensive control of
broadcasting content.'? These public interest groups can even be
reconceptualized as competing with the broadcast licensees for "own-
ership" of the license. As much as the broadcaster, the public interest
group sought to assert control over the content of the airwaves with-
out paying a market price for a license. Although unheard of at the
time, true reform might well have been for an interest group pro-
posing a content format to participate in an auction for a license and
test their ideas in both capital and viewing markets. Operating well
outside the market forces, however, skirmishes remained against
mismatched groups and, when waged, only further rigidified the
notion that revenue considerations were irrelevant in the disposition
of federal properties.'87
The interest group dynamics outlined above only partially
explain the failure of the political process to reform property disposi-
tion schemes. After all, since the beneficiaries of many disposition
programs were by nature small in number and often confined geo-
graphically, it was necessary for them to garner other substantial
legislative supporters to pass programs and to fend off reform efforts.
How were these supportive coalitions formed out of discrete groups
and their legislative supporters?
Part of the explanation for interest group and legislative
acquiescence may arise from classic logrolling that occurs in the
legislative process.' Those supporting grazing subsidies, for in-
stance, depend upon other groups' support for enacting (or preserving)
186. See Hazlett, supra note 167, at 910-11 (arguing that government's need to assign
licenses does not logically carry with it right to control content of licensee's broadcasting). This
point has been made for years based upon First Amendment rights of broadcasters. See LUCAS
A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 197-215 (1987); Matthew L.
Spitzer, Controlling the Content of Print and Broadcast, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1349, 1386-1402
(1985).
187. See Hazlett, supra note 167, at 931-32 ('[B]ecause non-profit lobbyists rationally
perceive federal licensing as an institution affording them a higher return on their human
capital, such agents will strongly favor public trusteeship for self-interested reasons."). See also
id. at 932 ('This calculus recognizes the essential fact that the public trusteeship approach
substitutes political discretion for market allocation, the latter being the alternative wherein
rights are sssigned via a competitive bidding process.").
188. See Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has
Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21, 31-32 (1997) (describing logrolling on special interest legislation that
redistributes benefits); Thomas Stratmann, The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting,
82 AM. ECON. REV. 1162, 1164 (1992) (noting that logrolling is most common with subsidies and
special tax benefits).
1744 [Vol. 52:1705
GOVERNMENTAL DISPOSITION
the grazing program. Supporters of grazing subsidies may in turn
agree to support mining interests in blocking reform of the mining
laws in exchange for mining interest support of blocking reform of the
grazing programs. This logrolling is entirely rational so long as the
gains for the ranchers receiving the grazing subsidies are greater
than the revenue losses ranchers bear from the grant of below cost
mining claims to their coalition partners.18 9 This calculation should
typically result in a net gain to both groups since the benefits are
concentrated and the costs they bear are distributed among them-
selves and all citizens.
Although logrolling may be efficient for the coalition part-
ners-ranchers and miners each gain more in benefits than each pays
in higher taxes because of their coalition formation-the cumulative
trades among all benefiting groups could well lead to net losses to a
particular group such as ranchers."9 While the ranchers may gain
from the grazing subsidies, the net cost of all federal property givea-
ways may require revenue or tax increases on the ranchers that are
actually greater than the grazing subsidies. In other words, the per
group cost associated with the grant of other benefits could well
exceed the per group gain. If that is so, why don't the ranchers simply
refuse to participate in the process and forbear from the grazing sub-
sidy to lower their overall tax burden? The problem is that each
group is trapped in a prisoner's dilemma.191 If one group declines to
logroll, then it still will likely incur the added tax burden of other
groups that are willing to form a majority coalition without gener-
ating the legislative subsidy for its own members.'92 For example, the
ranchers may decide not to seek grazing subsidies. However, mining
interests and broadcasters might form a majority coalition to continue
their interests, defecting while the ranchers take on a cooperative
strategy. The ranchers will continue to bear the burden of other
below-market schemes, made worse by the fact that they have forgone
189. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 188, at 31 ("Notwithstanding the aggregate welfare
loss, this type of vote trading would be attractive to representatives.... [Tihe terms of each
representative's trades, taken alone, might well provide her own constituents aggregate benefits
that exceed aggregate costs to them.').
190. See id. at 32.
191. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 139-40 (1962); Baker & Dinkin, supra note 188,
at 32-33.
192. Theoretically, all that is required is the formation of a minimal legislative coalition for
enactment. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS 32-54 (1962)
(developing the concept of minimum winning coalition). As Baker and Dinkin note, however,
the empirical proof suggests supermajority enacting coalitions. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note
188, at 32 n.31 (discussing literature on the point).
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their grazing subsidies to offset their losses. Thus, even if organized
groups perceive that rent-seeking ultimately injures their own mem-
bers, they may persist in striving to minimize that loss by procuring
some special benefit for their members.19
Congress, therefore, is unlikely to stop the financial bleeding.
Every group potentially benefiting from government sales and leases
will likely stick together to block substantial reform. Ideally,
Congress could counteract the prisoner's dilemma problem and-
despite interest group opposition-revise programs designed to sell
and lease government property. Congress at times has done just that,
and the market-based initiatives such as the auctions of electromag-
netic spectrum should be encouraged."' But the persistence of
grazing rights subsidies and the Mining Law of 1872 suggest that
general reform at the congressional level may not be forthcoming.
B. The Failures in Legal and Administrative Process Controls: The
Administrative Procedure Act and its Evolution
If, as we have argued above, reform through the political
process is difficult, it is logical to ask if reform and more effective
control and monitoring can occur at the agency level. Here two
related strategies are possible. First, the public could be granted
rights to participate in agency property proceedings and thereby
monitor when Congress fails to monitor or indeed seeks to use its
monitoring authority to perpetuate inefficient schemes.195 Second,
courts, through judicial review of agency action, could adopt broader
interests and protect the public fisc from agency dispositions that are
not controlled by market forces.
Although these options seem viable, we remain pessimistic
that legal controls that focus upon greater monitoring through public
participation or judicial review are likely to solve the problems we
have identified. Our skepticism follows from two concerns distinct to
the evolution of legal controls over government property disposition
193. See generally BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 191, at 139-43; MICHAEL T. HAYES,
LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS 57-58 (1981).
194. Congress, for instance, ended the lottery system in allocating broadcast rights and
leases for on-shore oil.
195. That is, the agency bureaucracy might seek to drift away from the original rent-
seeking goals and Congress may be called upon to force the agency back to the original
redistributionist deal. On legislative oversight of agencies, see generally Hugo Hopenhayn &
Susanne Lohmann, Fire-Alarm Signals and the Political Oversight of Regulatory Agencies, 12
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 196 (1996); Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 165 (1984).
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schemes. First, the failure to conceptualize government property
dispositions as regulatory policymaking is itself a distinct failure of
the legal system. As we discuss below, the basic legal charter for
controlling and monitoring government agencies-the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA")-largely exempted this important area.
Indeed, if interest groups advantaged by the disposition scheme are as
powerful as suggested, there should be reason to doubt the efficacy of
legal controls since these same groups will have an impact on the
design of these controls. Second, even as the legal regime evolved to
include property disposition programs, both old and new limits on the
ability of law to allow for effective monitoring became apparent.
Below we sketch out these developments in administrative law and
their impact on governmental property schemes.
1. The Original APA and the Sale, Management, and
Disposition of Government Property
Recent historical scholarship has highlighted the lengthy,
contentious, and political character of the process that led to the
enactment of the APA.19 Adopted after World War II, but in the long
shadow of Roosevelt's aggressive reconceptualization of federal
governmental and executive power, the APA was, in George
Shepherd's terms, a "fierce compromise." '197 The battle over the APA
was fundamentally one of government power over private property
and private enterprise, with the question of legal control over agency
action central to the debate.'98 Particularly in the context of adminis-
trative adjudication, opponents of agency power sought to place both
strict procedural and judicial controls over agency decisionmaking. 99
Although less visibly, both the APA drafters"° and the Supreme
196. See generally RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE
NEW DEAL (1995); McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative
Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996).
197. See Shepherd, supra note 196, at 1557.
198. See id. at 1559, 1574-77; see also SHAMIR, supra note 196, at 12, 104-05.
199. See Shepherd, supra note 196, at 1574, 1582-83 (detailing numerous proposals to
control agency adjudication and make it as similar to court litigation as possible). This is
reflected in the numerous provisions in the APA that address and detail the procedures for
adjudication. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-557 (1994).
200. See Shepherd, supra note 196, at 1588 (discussing inclusion of provisions on notice
and comment rulemaking).
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Court2 1 expressed considerable concern over broad grants of agency
rulemaking powers.
This contentious political struggle to exert legal and judicial
control over agency powers entirely bypassed the disposition and
management of government property. This neglect can hardly be
contributed to either novelty or insignificance. In various enactments
and programs predating the New Deal,2 2 federal bureaus and agen-
cies had been granted broad powers to sell, manage, or give away
government properties. Yet, consistent with our overall theme, the
APA as debated and enacted failed to recognize explicitly the regula-
tory aspects of property sales, management, or disposition, and no-
where attempted to integrate the subject into the APA structure or
methodology.
When the APA addresses the management, sale, or disposition
of property, it does so largely by exclusion from those provisions that
seem designed to ensure legal controls and public participation. By
the time of the enactment of the APA, agencies had been authorized
to promulgate rules that had prospective effect.0" Lacking, however,
was any general procedure agencies were to follow in adopting these
rules. The APA filled this gap primarily through the adoption of
procedures for notice and comment rulemaking. °' Although the
rulemaking provisions of the APA drew little attention in the drafting
process, the issue of public property was specifically treated. The
APA expressly excepts from notice and comment rulemaking "a
matter relating to... public property, loans, grants, benefits, or
contracts."0 5 The import of this explicit exclusion is two-fold: first,
the drafters of the APA saw no need to subject federal agency deci-
sions on public property to public scrutiny brought about by notice
and comment rulemaking; second, it would only be through consider-
able struggle that the public would be aware of, much less participate
in, agency property decisions."
201. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30, 537-42
(1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420-30 (1935); PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW
DEAL LAWYERS 70-71 (1982) (tracing Court's concerns over proliferation of secret agency rules).
202. See supra Part I discussing mining, grazing, and electromagnetic spectrum programs,
all predating the New Deal.
203. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 86 (1943) (noting power in SEC to proceed by
rulemaking to address abuses arising in corporate reorganizations).
204. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
205. See id. § 553(a)(2).
206. Given the attention devoted to the adjudication provisions of the APA it might be
expected that Congress expected that government property decisions would be monitored
through this formal adjudicative structure. We believe this highly unlikely. First, the formal
adjudicatory procedures of the APA are triggered only when an agency statute calls for an
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Several reasons explain this legislative oversight and delib-
erate exclusion of government property."°7 For those drafting the APA
the major concern no doubt was protecting the regulated public-
primarily private enterprise-from arbitrary and secret admini-
strative action.0 8 Thus, the proposed bills no doubt conceived of
agency actions as coercive efforts by the government to reach into the
affairs of individuals and business. Coming on the heels of the New
Deal, the drafters were reacting to a new form of government
interference in the market, not to the government's longstanding
practices of disposing its property.
In a related historical fashion, the drafters of the APA were
legislating against the backdrop of entirely different notions of prop-
erty rights. Classic government regulations-a charge of an unfair
labor practice brought by the NLRB or an enforcement proceeding
against a securities underwriting firm--could clearly be understood
as touching on traditional property rights.0 9 No doubt the constitu-
tional revolution of 1937 altered our conceptions of governmental
power to regulate private property rights.210 Yet that revolution failed
to change established notions of what did or did not qualify as a prop-
erty right. Central to this constitutional vision was the right-privilege
distinction. 1 The granting or disposition of money or properties
agency hearing on the record. See id. § 554(a). Second, it rests on the assumption that those
with interests in government property were not able to protect existing interests through either
informal administrative arrangements or more specific statutory rights. This assumption is
doubtful. See CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DESIGNING JUDICIAL REVIEW: INTEREST GROUPS, CONGRESS,
AND COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 120 (1997) (discussing judicial review provisions affecting radio
interests in Communications Act). Third, creating formal hearing rights would have simply
created monitoring rights for those who were already benefiting from the existing inefficient
scheme. In other words, the only potential interests recognized at the time of the enactment of
the APA would be program beneficiaries and therefore adjudicative hearings would hardly have
been an effective way of combating waste and inefficiencies in government property disposition
programs.
207. An earlier comprehensive analysis exists. See Arthur Earl Bonfield, Public
Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or
Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1970).
208. See Shepherd, supra note 196, at 1606-07; Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Profession
and the Development of Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1119, 1134-35 (1997).
209. See Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1936), in which the Court remarked:
[I]f the various administrative bureaus and commissions, necessarily called and being
called into existence by the increasing complexities of our modern business and political
affairs, are permitted gradually to extend their powers by encroachments-even petty
encroachments-upon the fundamental rights, privileges and immunities of the people,
we shall in the end.., become submerged by a multitude of minor invasions of personal
rights, less destructive but no less violative of constitutional guaranties.
210. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 127-34 (2d ed. 1998).
211. See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 59-60, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affid by an equally
divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). The demise of the doctrine can be traced judicially to
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owned or created by government action was not entitled to constitu-
tional protection. These were not properties traditionally recognized
by the common law, but privileges granted or denied in the govern-
ment's discretion. It would have indeed seemed odd for the drafters of
the APA to have recognized strong property rights in what were then
largely perceived of and constructed as government privileges.212
Concededly, there were many with a strong interest in how the
federal government disposed of its property. Certainly at the time of
the APA's adoption, strong interests in mining, grazing, and logging
on federal lands were well established. Broadcasting interests were
also maturing.21 But even here, interest group politics explain the
APA's failure to address the problem. Because strong interest groups
had already formed in a number of areas such as grazing, mining,
timber, and broadcasting, their existence and keen interest in
government property is not inconsistent with the APA's somewhat
dismissive treatment of the topic. It is entirely possible that these
groups were quite comfortable shielding agency workings from the
protections of the APA."4 If these groups had already come to influ-
ence and control relevant government agencies and bureaus, through
either their own actions or with the assistance and intervention of
powerful legislators, exclusion from the APA might have been the
optimal choice. 5 A different approach, where agency decisions were
open and subject to broader participation, would disserve the interest
of these groups.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970), and intellectually to Charles A. Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
212. See Bonfield, supra note 207, at 572-73. Interestingly, there was a smattering of cases
that sought due process rights for recipients of below-cost use of government property who faced
a termination of those rights. A claim for a hearing was almost uniformly rejected. See
Mollohan v. Gray, 413 F.2d 349, 352-53 (9th Cir. 1969) (upholding cancellation of grazing
allotment); United States v. Walker, 409 F.2d 477, 481-82 (9th Cir. 1969) (denying mining
claim). But see Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 32-33 (9th Cir. 1959) (holding that due process
requires a hearing before denial of a mining patent). Consistent with our earlier point, see
supra notes 141-42, we doubt that making hearing rights available for disappointed
beneficiaries would be a useful means of eliminating special interest waste in government
property programs. Indeed, the point is made dramatically by the fact that the program with
the most elaborate hearing rights and judicial review-broadcasting-departed most from
market forces.
213. See SHIPAN, supra note 206, at 85, 89.
214. See Zeppos, supra note 208, at 1131-32 (discussing efforts by drafters to exclude well
established agencies-e.g., FTC, Customs Service, Patent Office-from the APA).
215. See McNollgast, supra note 196, at 185 (sketching out theoretical literature on ex ante
control of procedures to create a favorable decisionmaking environment); see also Mathew D.
McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 243 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure, 29 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 299 (1985).
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A final reason for the APA's largely dismissive treatment of
the regulatory aspects of property disposition is a pragmatic one.
Congress was no doubt concerned about the administrative and finan-
cial burdens that would be imposed upon agencies if their property
disposition decisions were swept into the more formal decisionmaking
models of the APA."6 Considering the numerous and varied property
activities undertaken by the government, it might well have been
deemed too costly to equate these actions with the more typical regu-
latory actions covered by the APA. For the drafters, these costs would
be incurred while producing very little in the way of benefits,
particularly given the dominant intellectual conceptions of property
existing at that time.
2. Shifting Trends in Administrative Law
Although the causes of the APA's exclusion and neglect of
government property schemes are perhaps less than certain, its
effects were not. The exclusion reflects a clear failure in conceptuali-
zation. Federal property was simply not part of fashioning regulatory
policy. Each disposition scheme became largely a sovereign world,
affected less by law than by the exercise of political power by those
with the strongest interests in the particular property. This
arrangement, however, was far from static. The dominant conceptu-
alization that placed government property schemes outside of broader
regulatory policymaking was contingent upon intellectual, political,
and economic forces.
Not surprisingly, as the bedrock conceptions of administrative
law and process changed, a rethinking of the place of government
asset and property dispositions ensued. Four major forces for this
change can be identified. First, the original conceptions of the
administrative state were closely linked with claims of administrative
expertise, political independence, and deference to executive deci-
sionmakers. Early proponents of administrative government relied
upon the institutional advantage provided by expert agencies over
generalist judges." ' Clearly, the APA-and the long battle that pre-
ceded its enactment-reflects both some distrust of these expertise
claims as well as a political dimension to what superficially appeared
216. See Bonfield, supra note 207, at 575.
217. See JAMES H. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938); SHAMIR, supra note 196,
at 103, 134.
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to be only a disagreement about institutional competence.218 Yet the
primary justification for administrative government, while imbued
with politics at least initially, contained strong institutional claims.
Numerous scholars have analyzed the decline of this expertise
model of administrative government.219 This paradigmatic shift had
profound implications for administrative process, and the law gener-
ally."° Its effect on government property programs, while perhaps
less clear, is nonetheless discernible. Certainly for some government
property programs, decoupling administrative management from
claims of expertise would make them more central to general issues of
administrative government. The expertise model was based primarily
upon administrators subject to legislative limitations applying
specialized knowledge to problems of government.2 1 Management of
federal lands and forests called for technical application of principles
of forestry, agronomy, mining, or hydrology.21
The second force of change can be found in the new dominant
conception of administrative law. As others have recounted in
detail,223 rejection of an expertise justification for agencies left unan-
swered many difficult questions about how agencies do or should
function. Emphasis was now placed on interest group access to and
representation in agency decisionmaking processes.24 Here the effect
on government disposition programs was more obvious. As the focus
became interest group representation, the APA neglect became more
obvious. Groups could always lobby agency decisionmakers on prop-
erty decisions, but the emphasis on representation most easily fit into
the APA's provisions on informal rulemaking.25 The notice and com-
ment rulemaking model seemed well-suited for groups to be heard by
the agency."' Yet, as noted above, the APA specifically excepted
218. See Shepherd, supra note 196, at 1560, 1571-72.
219. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 1039, 1050-55 (1997); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1681-88 (1975).
220. See Merrill, supra note 219, at 1055-56.
221. See James 0. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1041, 1056-60 (1975).
222. See JAMES C. ScoTw, SEEING LIKE A STATE 19-20 (1998) (discussing early efforts to
apply scientific principles to forestry management).
223. See sources cited supra note 219.
224. See Stewart, supra note 219, at 1711-13.
225. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994).
226. See Merrill, supra note 219, at 1093-94 (discussing evolution of doctrine in D.C.
Circuit).
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government property from the requirements of notice and comment
rulemaking.227
Similarly, despite its seemingly narrow scope, the formal adju-
dication model of the APA was readily molded to the broader interest
group representation model.228 Recognition of the interest of different
groups,229 along with relaxed rules of intervention,23 allowed for this
form of agency action to accommodate more than simple bipolar litiga-
tion. Again, however, while not specifically excepted from the APA
provisions on formal adjudication, government property programs
could be included in this new model only with significant doctrinal
innovations.231
Of course, this emphasis on interest group representation did
not occur in a political or social vacuum. Perhaps defying theoretical
predictions,232 and against the backdrop of attacks on agency compe-
tence,233 groups representing broader public interests in federal
government property decisions began to form. For government prop-
erty decisions, the most important of these were the environmental
groups. It is difficult to overstate the effect of the environmental
movement on the incremental incorporation of federal property deci-
sions into the evolving administrative law and process.2 4 Recognizing
that federal land, water, and resource policies dramatically affect the
environment, these groups were instrumental in pressing both agen-
cies and Congress to make agency policies more transparent, respon-
sible, and accountable. Sometimes the shift came in the form of newly
adopted statutes that largely undid the APA's exclusions.3 5 Other
227. See supra note 206.
228. See Merrill, supra note 219, at 1064.
229. See id.; Stewart, supra note 219, at 1760-90.
230. See Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1000-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
231. See Merrill, supra note 219, at 1097.
232. See Croley, supra note 177, at 45-49.
233. See Merrill, supra note 219, at 1062-64.
234. Descriptive and theoretical accounts of group formation in the area of environmental
protection abound. See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 121 (1982) (explaining group
formation by noting small contribution that produces enormous benefits for the environment);
SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 183.
235. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102-04, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332-4334
(1994); Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 § 102(a)(5), 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(5);
National Forest Management Act of 1976 §§ 6, 11, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(d), 1612(a). See generally
George Cameron Coggins & Jane Elizabeth Van Dyke, NEPA and Private Rights in Public
Mineral Resources: The Fee Complex Relative? 20 ENVTL. L. 649 (1990).
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times, however, agencies voluntarily agreed to subject their decision-
making processes to APA procedures.23
The third major development that coincided with the incorpo-
ration of government property decisions into the broader APA frame-
work was the general critique and reconceptualization of government
regulation. Traditional theories of regulation focused upon a public
good achievable by the agency, largely through top-down controls and
enforcement. Economists challenged the foundations of this
approach.237 Regulation served private, not public, interests. Com-
mand and control regulation, even if motivated by the public interest,
was inefficient and ineffective.23 s  Classic forms of regulation-
barriers to entry, market segmentation, and price setting-were now
obvious examples of private interests benefiting through government
action. While conveniently escaping the more traditional conception
of regulation, government property decisions could not avoid charges
of private interest influence. If critics of regulation could demonstrate
how all banking customers are effectively taxed by the ban on
interest-bearing checking accounts-the classic broadly imposed but
minimal "tax" collected for the benefit of the few-the same analysis
applied to the below-cost sale of federal patents to mining companies
or giveaway of broadcast licenses.
Finally, the increased political saliency of the federal budget
deficit, along with strict budgeting rules, increased the prominence of
federal asset disposition programs.239 As an initial step, it was impor-
tant to the inclusion of government property decisions into admin-
istrative law to recognize the private gains associated with these
schemes. But supplemented by budgetary pressures, the calls for
political, legal, and public scrutiny became even more intense.
Consider, for example, FCC licensing decisions. Clearly an economic
analysis of the early licensing schemes reveals that private broad-
casters received enormous financial benefits at little cost and at great
236. See the waiver by the Department of Agriculture-regulator of federal forests-in
Rodway v. United States Department of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809, 813-14 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
237. See Merrill, supra note 219, at 1061-62.
238. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 114-25
(1975). This transformation is detailed and critiqued in Croley, supra note 177, at 42-56.
239. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset
Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1998) [hereinafter Garrett,
Harnessing Politics]; Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the
Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387 (1998) [hereinafter Garrett, Structures of
Decisionmaking].
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loss of revenue to the government.24 But so long as the revenue losses
are of little political significance, disputes among contentious groups
will be focused almost exclusively upon issues of broadcasting content
or how to divide the gains. When revenue losses become salient,
however, the political battle and licensing scheme will change signifi-
cantly.241 Given that tax increases provide an unattractive alterna-
tive, the sale of government assets became a logical source of revenue.
This, in turn, inspired political leaders to quickly grasp both the
range of assets, as well as innovative ways to maximize revenues for
these assets.
3. Shortcomings of the Maturing Principles of Administrative Law
and Monitoring of Government Property Disposition Programs
These trends incorporated government property dispositions
schemes into the larger debate over regulation and law. The APA
depends largely upon public participation in agency processes and the
availability of ex post judicial review to serve as mechanisms for
monitoring and controlling agency action. Clearly, the same tools
have been deployed by entities, groups, and individuals seeking to
monitor government property disposition programs. To be sure, there
is much to be said in favor of the transformation of the outright
neglect or exclusion of government property from basic principles of
administrative law to the ultimate inclusion in the central features of
administrative law and process. Yet it would be a mistake to see this
process as complete or entirely successful. Below we discuss defi-
ciencies in the evolution of administrative law as a means for moni-
toring agency behavior as well as broader challenges in meshing these
maturing principles with the shifting goals of property disposition
schemes.
a. The Increased Costs of Monitoring Agency Property
Disposition Decisions
As is clear from our discussion, the federal government makes
countless decisions annually that affect the use, disposition, and
management of federal properties. The resource generation and
240. See generally Spitzer, supra note 62. See also sources cited supra note 168. Media
reports on government sales of assets directly link privatization and the budget. See Benjamin
A. Holden, Three Federal Utilities May Be Sold By Year's End Under Bipartisan Plan, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 11, 1995, atA4.
241. See Garrett, supra note 239, at 501-02.
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allocation decisions for entities, groups, and individuals seeking to
monitor these many decisions are formidable. These monitors will
obviously seek to identify, influence, and challenge those decisions
that are most important to their interests. Implementing such a
strategy suggests that the monitoring entity will seek to minimize not
only the costs of searching out and learning about these decisions but
also the costs of challenging them as well. Unfortunately, the existing
legal regime undermines this cost effective strategy.
Three considerations could affect the costs of searching for and
learning about agency actions: the public nature of the announce-
ment, the amount of accompanying explanation, and the number of
people affected. The greater the amount of all three of these, the
lower the costs of search and translation. Translating this economic
calculus into administrative agency action makes clear that proposed
agency rules are the easiest to detect and understand. Likewise,
because the rules are likely to have the broadest impact on agency
policy, investment in lobbying and litigation are likely to produce the
greatest return.242 It follows that legal doctrines that deter legal
challenges to agency rules will significantly increase monitoring costs.
The interested group or entity must now keep track of every rule and
every individual disposition decision and see if the latter applies the
rule in a harmful way. Moreover, every such harmful decision must
now be separately challenged in a court.
Earlier precedents had allowed for preenforcement review of
agency rules, which thus significantly decreased costs of monitoring
and challenging agency action.43 In two landmark decisions, however,
the Supreme Court held that aggrieved persons or groups must await
a decision on a particular parcel of land before seeking judicial review.
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation (Lujan I) involved a challenge
to the BLM's land withdrawal review program undertaken under the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA"). 2 4 Pursuant to
this program, the BLM reclassified various tracts of land and adopted
plans to return others to the public domain.245 The plaintiff, an envi-
ronmental organization and some of its members, filed an action
claiming that the BLM's actions violated the FLPMA, NEPA, and the
APA. 46 Plaintiffs alleged that they used land in the vicinity of land
242. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 224 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that the generality of the rule is central to the definition in 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)).
243. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-48 (1967).
244. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n (Lujan 1), 497 U.S. 871, 875 (1990).
245. See id. at 877.
246. See id. at 879.
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subject to BLM actions.247 The Court first held that the individuals
alleging use of land in the vicinity of areas directly covered by the
BLM's actions were not aggrieved by agency action under section 702
of the APA.248 Absent a specific allegation that the individual's use of
the actual land reclassified was affected, no showing of injury could be
made.249
The Court further concluded that, as to plaintiffs' challenges to
other BLM actions, there was simply no "agency action!' reviewable by
a court.2 0 The Court noted that plaintiffs claimed to be challenging a
land withdrawal review program undertaken by the BLM. But to the
Court there was no such program. Rather, this was simply the char-
acterization plaintiffs had given to a broad and varied series of dis-
connected actions by the BLM in enforcing and implementing the law.
Missing from the plaintiffs' presentation was the ability to identify
any particular agency action that was the focus of their request for
relief. To be sure, the agency's plans did identify some actions that
arguably could fall within the definition of "rule!' provided in the
APA. '5 But even here the Court suggested that review of a rule must
await its application to a particular factual controversy. Review, if it
were to proceed, would have to be predicated upon a particular land
use decision affecting a specific parcel of land that an individual
plaintiff was alleged to have used.
Lujan I raises the prospect of agency policies and decisions
that are so broad and related but episodic in character as to fall out-
side of the definition of "agency action" and hence unreviewable. It
now seems clear that challenging agency property decisions will
require some formal action by the agency that can be understood as a
coherent, focused, and integrated measure that is targeted at a
specific piece of property. Efforts to string together agency decisions
that are related by subject matter, statutory law, or regulatory initia-
tive will in all likelihood not be conceptualized as agency action.
Clearly, the Court has adopted the view that "retail" as opposed to
247. See id. at 886.
248. See id. at 889.
249. See id.
250. Sections 702 to 704 of the APA allow judicial review of final agency action. See 5
U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (1994). The APA, in turn, defines "agency action" as "the whole or a part of
an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to
act." Id. § 551(13).
251. See id. § 551(4) (defining "rule" for the purposes of the APA).
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"wholesale" challenges will be the accepted form for challenging
agency decisions.252
The Court reaffirmed the Lujan I approach in Ohio Forestry
Ass'n v. Sierra Club.253 There the Forest Service, acting pursuant to
the National Forest Management Act of 1976, developed land and
resource management plans for the Wayne National Forest in south-
ern Ohio. Plans developed under the Act set forth the various per-
missible uses for the covered forests and required consideration of
environmental and commercial interests. The Plan specifically per-
mitted clear-cut logging to take place on a substantial part of the
Wayne National Forest.254 However, while the Plan "sets logging
goals [and] selects the areas of the forest that are suited to timber
production,.., it does not itself authorize the cutting of any trees."255
That can occur only after a sequential process beginning with a spe-
cific proposal to harvest, proceeding through a series of hearings and
environmental assessments, and ultimately administrative and judi-
cial review."' Despite these many steps between the initial plan and
actual logging, it was conceded that "the Plan's promulgation none-
theless makes logging more likely in that it is a logging precondition;
in its absence logging could not take place." '57
Plaintiffs challenged the Plan raising claims under the APA,
NEPA, and the National Forestry Management Act.258 The Supreme
Court held that the challenge was not ripe for review.259 On the ques-
tion of harm, the Court concluded that plaintiffs' environmental
interests had in no way been compromised: "the Plan does not give
anyone a legal right to cut trees."2" Likewise, the Plan did not pre-
clude a later challenge to a specific decision to cut timber, which
might include an attack on the Plan as well, so long as "the Plan plays
a causal role with respect to the future, then-imminent, harm from
. 252. The Ninth Circuit has allowed challenges to broader agency decision and rejected the
notion that only the individual implementation decisions are subject to judicial review. See
Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705, 708 (9th Cir. 1993); Idaho Conservation
League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1513-18 (9th Cir. 1992). Whether these cases have any
precedential value after Lujan Iis doubtful.
253. See Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S 726, 732-37 (1998).
254. The Wayne National Forest consists of 278 square miles. The plan permitted timber
cutting on 197 square miles. See id. at 729.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 729-30 (describing agency processes culminating in permit to cut).
257. See id. at 730.
258. See id. at 731.
259. See id. at 732.
260. See id. at 733.
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logging.''26' The Court explicitly acknowledged plaintiffs' interest in
reducing legal expenses by mounting "one legal challenge against the
Plan now." 62 This practical concern was unpersuasive: "[Tihe Court
has not considered this kind of litigation costsaving sufficient by itself
to justify review in a case that would otherwise be unripe. 263
Apart from the absence of harm to the plaintiffs, the Court
noted that preenforcement review would "hinder agency efforts to
refine its policies [and] would require time-consuming judicial con-
sideration of the details of an elaborate, technically based plan.""
Conversely, focusing review on a specific harvesting permit would
identify the matters in controversy for the Court. Finally, the Court
thought it relevant that Congress had in a variety of environmental
statutes specifically authorized preenforcement review of rules.265 The
inference for the Court was clear: the absence of any specific reference
in the National Forest Management Act reflected a congressional
judgment that review await actual plan implementation.266
The impact of Lujan I and Ohio Forestry on judicial review as a
mechanism for monitoring agency property management and disposi-
tion could be quite significant. Insofar as agencies should be encour-
aged to adopt broad policies at the rulemaking stage to encourage
public participation in the formulation of disposition procedures and
priorities, Lujan I and Ohio Forestry sow doubts as to the re-
viewability of such agency decisions.267 Indeed, in this respect Lujan I
261. See id. at 734.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 735
264. See id. at 735-36.
265. See id. at 737.
266. See id.
267. Lujan I and Ohio Forestry must be read in conjunction with the Court's decision in
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994). There, a coal company sought to
challenge the Department of Labor's regulation authorizing union personnel to participate in
safety inspections at a nonunion mine. See id. at 204. The coal company brought suit after the
agency initiated a civil enforcement proceeding for violation of its regulation. See id. at 205.
The Court held that the matter was not ripe for review. See id. at 207-09. Only after the full
administrative proceeding had run its course could review be sought. See id. The tension
between Thunder Basin and Abbott Laboratories is obvious. Thunder Basin makes clear that
even where the government by regulation affects the interest of private property owners,
judicial review must ordinarily await ful enforcement of the regulation in the particular
context. Certainly if the Court requires those with private property rights to seek review only
after enforcement, it is unlikely to adopt a more forgiving standard for parties challenging the
disposition or regulation of public property. After all, the claims of hardship and individual
rights are likely to be perceived as substantially less powerful in the latter context-both for
those who complain about excessive development or use (environmentalists or recreational
users) as well as those who seek more developments (loggers, ranchers, and mining industry).
See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (jurisdiction over challenges by those seeking
economic use to individualized decisions affecting Federal property); Sweet Home Chapter v.
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and Ohio Forestry create perverse incentives for the agency. Agencies
will be tempted to adopt broad rules or policies that appear discon-
nected and episodic or vague in order to avoid judicial review. Such
action can only damage the public's presumed goal of adopting a
coherent and rational plan for property disposition and management.
And, insofar as policy decisions are pushed down to the individual
decisionmaking level, public participation becomes more problematic.
Groups or individuals with scarce resources may not be able to par-
ticipate in every individualized proceeding and may even be unaware
of the individual dispositions affecting their interests.
b. Other Hurdles to Public Participation and Monitoring
Agency Property Decisions
In light of Lujan I and Ohio Forestry, efforts to monitor agency
property decisions are likely to be shifted to participation in and
review of individual adjudicative decisions. But whether this is a
useful or efficient device for monitoring agency behavior is a different
question. Indeed, a shift to monitoring through public participation in
an adjudication may well signal an overall failure of a property dispo-
sition scheme.
First, it may well be that those who are the direct beneficiaries
of the government's property disposition decisions have little reason
to seek full public participation in adjudicative hearings. Indeed, they
may well prefer that the decision be made informally and not subject
to public scrutiny. To be sure, an entity seeking a mining patent or
grazing permit wants to be heard by the agency granting the benefits.
Yet it hardly follows that their interest is in a formal public hearing.
Indeed, if our overall assessment of government property sales and
management is correct-that much of it is riddled with rent-seeking
and inefficiencies with substantial revenue loss to the government-it
seems that two points follow. First, since the statutory criteria favor
the beneficiaries, initial agency decisions contrary to beneficiary
interests are likely to be rare. Hence a formal public hearing appeal-
ing adverse agency action will be rare as well.268 Without public
hearings, public participation as a means of monitoring is of little use.
Indeed, since the beneficiaries of the scheme have developed close
Babbitt, 515 U.S. 95 (1995) (allowing challenge to application of agency regulation affecting
specific piece of property).
268. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 434-35
(1989).
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long-term relationships with agency personnel, informal resolution of
any conflicts with beneficiaries is likely to be the preferred outcome.
In other words, if an interest group is powerful enough to put in place
a statutory scheme that allows the group economic advantages in the
use or purchase of federal property, it is likely that the scheme will
create adequate procedures and standards for preserving those
advantages. We would expect that the scheme would be 'hardwired"
to put in place procedures to make sure that over time bureaucratic
drift within the agency would not threaten to withdraw these privi-
leges. 69 Or, if not found in the statutory scheme, we should expect
that agency regulations that would give the favored group hearing
rights before the agency would be adopted. Again, there is reason to
believe that such a pattern appears in federal law.
Consider the actions of agencies responsible for two major
federal property programs. The Forest Service proposed elimination
of its procedures allowing third parties to participate in decisions on
timber sales.20 The BLM has historically read its regulations to deny
third parties the right to participate in the process for renewal or
renegotiation of a grazing permit.271 Indeed, the BLM's position illus-
trates a potential "bait and switch" strategy growing out of Lujan I
and Ohio Forestry, as well as the way that legal mandates for broader
hearing rights are often unnecessary for direct beneficiaries, but
critical for interested third parties. The BLM regulates and manages
grazing rights and permits at several levels of specificity.27 At the
most general level, the BLM adopts Resource Management Plans
('RMiP's") pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 1976.273 These RMP's set forth the general principles and plans for
large areas of land, typically over one million acres. Given the scope
and variety of the area covered by an RMP, it is to be expected that
they are not rich in detail. They set out only the most general of
planning principles. The actual authorization to graze is found in a
grazing permit issued under the Taylor Grazing Act.7  This permit or
an allotment management plan ("AMP") that is incorporated into a
permit details the terms and conditions of grazing on the federal
269. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of
Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992).
270. The political battles over the Forest Service's efforts are discussed in Bradley C.
Bobertz & Robert L. Fischman, Administrative Appeal Reform: The Case of the Forest Service,
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 371 (1993).
271. The matter is fully explored in Feller, supra note 117, at 582-86.
272. See id. at 574-75.
273. See id. at 576.
274,. See id.
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parcel for which permission is given.275 Each permit typically comes
up for renewal every ten years.276
In fact, however, the authorization is subject to annual
adjustment on virtually every aspect of grazing. In this annual "rene-
gotiation" or renewal, the BLM can set the number of cattle that can
be grazed, where the grazing can occur, and any improvement or
other conditions found to be necessary. The BLM's own regulations
provide for public participation by interested persons when an agency
action on a permit takes place.277 However, the BLM has taken the
position that its annual review and adjustment is not an action war-
ranting participation. According to the BLM, only the ten-year
renewal constitutes agency action triggering the rights of interested
persons.278
The beneficiaries of the BLM program-like those in the
Forest Service's timber sales-need not enshrine their rights to be
heard in formal regulations. Ranchers can participate with the BLM
in the annual negotiation affecting grazing rights. While the rancher
may well take a risk in this informal renegotiation, the rancher is
likely to be overall much better off not requesting a formal hearing
and risking the participation of adverse third parties. Moreover, the
annual renegotiation leaves the circle of participation closed between
the rancher and the agency, a longstanding working relationship.279
Adjudication as a monitoring device suffers from a second
shortcoming. Relying on the APA model of decisionmaking by adjudi-
cation, as well as on the individual statutes calling for a hearing on
property dispositions, assumes that nonmarket variables dominate
the disposition decision.2 ° Accordingly, if any scheme of monitoring
agency property dispositions places too much emphasis on public
275. See id.
276. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 315b, 1752(a)-(b) (1994).
277. See 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1998).
278. See Feller, supra note 117, at 583-86. In an ironic twist, there have been reports that
the BLM is using the individual leasing negotiation process to cut back on rancher grazing
rights. See generally Carl M. Cannon, The Old-Timers, NAT'L J., May 22, 1999, at 1386.
279. The D.C. Circuit's recent decision in Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. NRC, No. 98-1426,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26578 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 22, 1999) can only further encourage agencies to
deny participation rights to interested third parties. The court there held that even if a party
meets the stringent requirements for Article III standing, an agency can deny participation in
an agency hearing. Further, the court held that an agency's interpretation of its participation
statute is due deference. The court, however, left unresolved whether the same principles
controlled the APA's intervention provision, 5 U.S.C. § 555 (1994).
280. See Feller, supra note 117, at 583-86.
1762 [Vol. 52:1705
GOVERNMENTAL DISPOSITION
participation in an adjudication, it may well be a strong signal that
the scheme is inefficient.81
Consider the evolutionary link between the FCC's disposition
procedures and its criteria for decisionmaking. When the FCC was
required to award licenses under the broad public interest mandate, it
utilized the elaborate and cumbersome Ashbacker2 2 hearings to
resolve disputes among competing applicants. As the agency and
commentators perceived the shortcomings of employing the amor-
phous public interest standard, the agency suggested alternative
disposition methods such as lotteries and auctions.283 The auction
option presents the many advantages already discussed. It promises
revenue to the government; it reduces delay and cost associated with
hearings; and it curbs the undue political influence that often times
mars the hearings. An auction therefore necessarily eliminates some
of the need for adjudication. The agency can proceed by regulation to
define how the nonadjudicative methods would work. But absent is
the usual more elaborate second step in property disposition-a
hearing or some kind of individualized determination for a particular
piece of property.
As long as the agency has sufficient incentive and expertise to
maximize revenues, 214 there is less need for costly procedural safe-
guards to accompany the specific sale and lease decisions. For
instance, if the agency retains a portion of the proceeds for internal
281. Similarly, the presence of judicial review of adjudicative orders may suggest an
inefficient scheme. See Shipan, supra note 181, at 553 (discussing why broadcasting interests
may have inserted judicial review provisions into Communication Act). If the only issue in the
disposition scheme is who the high bidder was, there may be little reason to authorize judicial
review. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1821j) (1994) (precluding review of sale of assets by receiver of
bank).
282. See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 333-34 (1946) (holding adjudicative
hearing required two applicants for competing license).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 144-49.
284. Care must be taken not to give the agency too much interest in the proceeds since that
may create incentives to sell assets at below cost. In this context consider the below-cost timber
sales undertaken by the Forest Service. Under the program, the agency harvests timber that it
then sells on the market. However, the costs of harvesting this timber-labor, road
construction, transportation--can exceed the price obtained in the subsequent sale. The Forest
Service manages the sale and is allowed to keep some of the proceeds. The obvious question is
why an agency would sell timber at a loss? Certainly no private producer would do so (unless as
a short-term measure to gain market share). The Forest Service does what no market producer
would because, unlike the market producer, the Forest Service is not required to internalize the
costs of the timber sales. Congress is quite willing to subsidize the sales for a variety of political
and economic considerations. And the Forest Service participates in this inefficient behavior
because it receives a financial benefit from the sales. Safeguards are therefore required if the
agency is not forced to internalize the costs of its disposition program.
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programming,285 the incentive to maximize revenue is clear, and the
likelihood that the agency will subsidize interest groups is less.
c. Judicial Review as a Monitoring Device: The Inadequacies
of Current Standing Doctrine
A central conclusion of this Article is that, although the
government legitimately considers nonmarket factors in selling or
disposing of property, there is a danger that the failure to maximize
revenues or the failure to balance revenue loss against other non-
economic interests is the result of interest group influence, often
accompanied by statutory obsolescence or agency capture. The public
at large suffers through loss to the Treasury or the irreparable harm
to federal property. This loss of revenue and failure to articulate how
the foregone revenue has been offset by other values or interests are
of the greatest concern and in need of remediation. Yet it is unlikely
that this revenue loss to the federal government-and indirectly to
citizens--could be a basis for standing.
In a virtually unbroken line of precedent, the Supreme Court
has held that a federal taxpayer has no standing to challenge the
expenditure of federal monies.286 More specifically, the Supreme
Court has rejected citizen standing to challenge the federal govern-
ment's decision to dispose of property. In Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
plaintiffs-a citizen and organization committed to protecting against
the establishment of religion-challenged the federal government's
decision to give property to a religious college.287 Plaintiffs alleged
that the government's giveaway of property violated the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment.288 The Court held that plain-
tiffs lacked standing.289 The Court concluded that, except in extra-
ordinarily limited circumstances, a plaintiff could not base standing
on taxpayer status.2 10 The Court reasoned that absent some particular
concrete injury, a plaintiff could not complain about the government's
285. The FCC may become entirely dependent on licensing fees. If an agency becomes too
dependent on revenue, it may slight other goals to the end of maximizing revenue. Some have
criticized local law enforcement agencies for abusing their forfeiture powers for that end.
286. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447, 486-89 (1923).
287. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1982).
288. See id. at 469.
289. See id. at 482, 486, 489.
290. See id. at 476-82.
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failure to follow the law.291 It seems safe to say that, if judicial super-
vision of agency property disposition and management is to be a rele-
vant part of any scheme of checking the abuse of agency discretion,
standing cannot be based on a citizen's right to have the law followed
or revenue loss suffered.
Foreclosure of citizen standing to protect against government
waste is therefore likely to channel claims for judicial review into two
other standing theories. Unfortunately, developments in these two
areas are likely to reduce the availability of judicial supervision as a
full and meaningful mechanism for monitoring.
First, a party may challenge a government property decision
by alleging injury in the interference in use or enjoyment of the prop-
erty. We tend now to think of actions brought by environmental
groups challenging the government's management and development
of property as classic cases where standing is based on "use" or
"enjoyment!' of property.292 Yet this standing doctrine can be found in
earlier challenges to FCC programming decisions.29 In these cases
the groups or individuals alleged no economic interest. Rather,
standing was based upon their interest as a "user" of the federal
property-i.e., they alleged to have been consumers of radio or televi-
sion as listeners or viewers.294 In a landmark decision, the D.C. Cir-
cuit upheld standing on the basis that a group or individual had an
interest in the content and quality of television broadcasting.295
Although the allegation of noneconomic use of federal property
as a cognizable Article III injury has become standard in cases in-
volving the wide range of disposal actions, standing in this area has
291. See id. at 486. The Court has made clear its commitment to the standing rules in
Valley Forge. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Lujan II), the Court reaffirmed Valley Forge.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Lujan i), 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992). There, plaintiffs invoked
the citizen standing provision of the Endangered Species Act seeking to challenge the federal
government's decisions to fund certain foreign development projects. See id. at 558-59. They
predicated standing on the statutory provision conferring upon any citizen the right to sue for
violation of the ESA. See id. at 571-72. The Court held that Article m does not permit
Congress to confer standing on a citizen to police violations of law. See id. at 573. Some
identification of a particular concrete injury caused by the alleged violation of law was
necessary. See id. at 576.
292. Earliest expressions of this theory can be found in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 734 (1972), and United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669, 686 (1973).
293. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 585-86 (1981); Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 999 F.2d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 1993); Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973, 976 n.21 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
294. See WNCN, 450 U.S. at 585.
295. See Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1002 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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proved controversial on an issue that provoked no debate in the FCC
cases-has the government's action in fact interfered with the plain-
tiffs use or enjoyment of the property? Unlike the FCC cases where
"use" was simple-merely turning on a television-in the area of land
management and sales this has proven to be a significant barrier to
standing. Indeed, the two most recent rulings by the Supreme Court
in this area jeopardize standing on this basis and hence judicial moni-
toring by increasing the costs to those who seek to challenge the
government's property decisions.
In Lujan I, involving plaintiffs' challenge to the BLM's decision
to reclassify certain federal lands and to authorize various develop-
ment activities on those lands, standing was based on allegations that
plaintiffs were recreational users of the lands and the authorized
development would interfere with that use.296 While the Court con-
ceded that the recreational injury was an injury recognized under
Article III, it went on to reject standing because plaintiffs had failed
to allege that they had in fact used the particular parcels that were
subject to the proposed development.297 At most, plaintiffs alleged that
they hiked in the vicinity of the affected land.298 For the Court this
was insufficient to establish standing for noneconomic injury.299 It was
essential that plaintiffs show that they were users of the actual land
reached by the government's action.3"
The Court reaffirmed this approach to standing in Lujan I. 3"1
There, plaintiffs challenged the Department of Interior's regulation
interpreting the Endangered Species Act to apply only to activities
occurring in the United States."2 Pointing to a number of foreign
government development projects undertaken with American finan-
cial assistance, plaintiffs alleged injury in the loss of species that they
sought to observe and study."' The Court again found no standing.3 "
Plaintiffs alleged only that they had previously gone to visit these
countries and observed certain species that were alleged to be threat-
ened by the federal government's support of the development
projects.09 Missing, however, were any claims that plaintiffs had
296. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n (Lujan 1), 497 U.S. 871, 886 (1990).
297. See id. at 889.
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Lujan I), 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992).
302. See id. at 558-59.
303. See id. at 562-63.
304. See id. at 564.
305. See id. at 563-64.
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immediate and certain plans to return to these countries and resume
their activities."° Absent such allegations, the Court found that the
plaintiffs failed to show that their injury was immediate rather than
speculative and conjectural."7
These standing rules significantly alter the economics of filing
an action challenging a government property decision. A plaintiff
must be found who actually uses or has definite plans to use a par-
ticular piece of land or travel to a particular place. This cost alone
may not be significant enough to deter suit but other costs are associ-
ated with this approach to standing as well. An action can be brought
only when a particular parcel of land is affected. General agency
rules or plans of use are not ripe for review. Thus, organizations and
interested individuals must keep track of what particular parcels or
lands are affected and then find a suitable plaintiff who meets the
demanding rules of standing. In particular, organizational plaintiffs
may be especially affected since they now cannot generally assert that
their members use or enjoy the property."8 It may instead be neces-
sary for them to find individual members who meet those criteria.
Not only does this tax organizational resources, but any lack of ability
to be an effective monitor through judicial action may well affect the
ability of the organization to seek financial support from current and
prospective members.0 9
Current standing rules therefore jeopardize the effectiveness of
judicial review as an effective monitor of agency property decisions by
those with a noneconomic interest in use or enjoyment of the prop-
erty. This leaves open the possibility of standing and monitoring by
someone with a direct economic interest in the property. While these
standing rules remain viable as a basis for suit, it is unlikely that this
form of review will achieve real reform.
One of the most frequently invoked bases for standing is eco-
nomic injury caused to a competitor. This sort of injury is in fact well
established as a basis for meeting the Article III standing require-
ments, and was indeed early recognized as a basis for a challenge to
the government's disposal of its property. In FCC v. Sanders Brothers
Radio Station the FCC granted a radio station a license to serve a
306. See id. at 564.
307. See id.
308. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n (Lujan 1), 497 U.S. 871, 892-93 & n.4 (1990)
(discussing effect of standing and ripeness rules on organizational standing).
309. See generally SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 183 (discussing litigation functions of
organizations).
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particular geographical area.1 ° Sanders Brothers Radio owned a
station in the same area and obviously did not welcome the competi-
tion provided by the new licensee.311 The Supreme Court held that the
competitive harm alleged by Sanders Brothers Radio was a basis for
standing to challenge agency action, even though the Communications
Act itself made harm to competitors irrelevant in the licensing
process.312 The Court reasoned that this was the optimal solution
because competitors were typically the ones to suffer the most harm
by the government's action and therefore have the greatest incentive
to bring a challenge.3 3 In other words, the Court perceived the com-
petitor as a necessary watchdog to oversee and police agency action.
At first glance there is much to be said for competitor standing.
The economic injury alleged by competitors is consistent with the
Court's obvious preference for economic injury as a basis for Article
III standing. Moreover, as the Court pointed out in Sanders Brothers
Radio Station, the competitor harmed by the government's action
typically has the greatest incentive to challenge agency action. A
more recent example of competitor standing challenging a government
giveaway of property is a challenge by various companies seeking
valuable frequency licenses from the FCC to the agency's so-called
pioneer preference rule that awards licenses at steep discounts to
those entities who have allegedly developed pioneering technology in
telecommunications. 14 The challengers-who were denied the pioneer
preferences and therefore had to pay substantially more for their
licenses-had an obvious incentive to bring the challenge and raised
charges of political influence and ex parte lobbying in the below-cost
sale of these valuable licenses. The fiscal impact of the FCC's decision
for the federal government is indeed significant and the competitor is
the obvious person to seek judicial review of the agency's controversial
decision. Insofar as we prefer that there be a judicial check on agency
decisions, competitors are likely to be the most aggressive challeng-
ers. Where a group of individuals has managed to dominate the
agency's decisionmaking process and the competitor is excluded from
participating, or has no chance of its views being considered or heard,
the pathology of agency process is likely to be subject to scrutiny.
310. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 472 (1940).
311. See id. at 471.
312. See id. at 475-77.
313. See id. at 477.
314. See Pacific Bell v. FCC, No. 94-1148, 1994 WL 475062 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 1994),
(dismissing case as moot); see also supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
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Although the economic harms and economic incentives associ-
ated with competitor standing can provide a natural monitoring
device, it nonetheless suffers from two shortcomings as a basis for
monitoring. First, in some situations there simply may not be a natu-
ral competitor harmed by the government's action. For example, in
the areas of mining, grazing, or timber sales there has not been a
pattern of competitors who might seek to challenge the free or below-
cost use. The reasons for this are not clear but one can speculate as to
why this is the case. It may be that in mining or grazing the nature of
the activity precludes a natural competitor. Because of geographical
ownership patterns, there may not be other ranchers who would also
seek to have a permit for the same land. Or with mining-
particularly now where the image of the lone prospector with his mule
is long gone and much is now done by large entities-it is unlikely
that some other company will step forward to assert that it first made
the claim. Indeed, if in some of these programs there are few real
players seeking to use or develop federal lands, a form of logrolling
can occur. No participant to the deal allowing the below-cost or
harmful use has an incentive to expose this to the public or have the
courts disrupt and monitor the arrangement.
Second, the competitor standing itself may in fact be evidence
of a deeply flawed statutory property scheme where below cost dispo-
sitions are the rule. The broadcasters complaining in Sanders
Brothers Radio Station objected to the award of a license to a competi-
tor. 15 The broadcaster did not challenge the basic idea of giving away
a valuable government license for free.316 Nor, of course, could they
since the governing statute mandated such a process. Indeed, com-
petitor standing strikes us as a bit of "sour grapes" by the competitor
who loses out and who would have gladly taken the license for free if
the tables had been turned. Similarly, in the pioneer preference
proceeding, the applicants who did not get the pioneer preferences for
themselves sought judicial review. In short, the presence of a com-
petitor is no guarantee that any judicial review will lead to effective
monitoring. Indeed, the presence of competitor standing sometimes
may be strong evidence that the statutory scheme itself is deeply
flawed. The challenging competitor is simply seeking to redistribute
315. See Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. at 477.
316. See id. at 476-77.
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the fruits of government largesse rather than seeking to alter the
basic flaws in the system.
317
Reform is needed. Although many agency disposition schemes
successfully generate revenue, agencies receive only a fraction of what
they could if maximization of revenue were their primary goal. Agen-
cies unquestionably pursue legitimate goals other than raising funds,
but nonmarket goals can mask under the table subsidies to private
groups. Interest groups have successfully pressured Congress and
agencies to dispose of public resources at below market prices. The
procedures established in the APA cannot prevent rent-seeking in
Congress, and they have failed as well to prevent interest groups from
obtaining benefits from agencies. The property exemption from rule-
making, and the limited right of third parties to participate in an
adjudication, leave agencies' property management decisions largely
unfettered. And, restrictive definitions of agency action, ripeness, and
standing circumscribe judicial review. As a result, agency disposition
decisions too often bypass the checks of public participation and judi-
cial review, both of which are intended to safeguard the public from
agency capture and mismanagement.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
In light of the above discussion on monitoring the disposition
and management of public assets by agencies, revamping agency
disposition practices is critical. Ideally, a monitoring scheme could
mimic the market oversight mechanism of shareholders so as to pre-
vent wasteful management and the siphoning off of revenue to par-
ticular interest groups. Agency managers would face the wrath of
shareholders (or some type of analogue) for every botched deal or
disclosed subsidy.
A market solution, however, is not always possible due to the
programmatic and distributional concerns underlying the govern-
ment's disposition efforts. Although agency incentives to maximize
revenue should be sharpened, a market cannot second-guess the
preeminently political tradeoffs between revenue maximization and
rights of the homeless or the traditions of Western ranchers. More-
over, even if reform were pushed at one government level-whether
317. See SHIPAN, supra note 206, at 84-95 (providing interest group explanation for judicial
review provisions of the Communications Act).
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by Congress, the agencies, or the judiciary-intransigence at the
other two levels could thwart or at least slow change. Because of the
interest group pressures we have addressed, we think the proponents
of dramatic change face a significant challenge.
Nonetheless, some beneficial reform-even aside from restruc-
turing government disposition efforts on a market basis318 -can be
attained by subjecting disposition decisions to a variety of oversight
mechanisms already considered useful for monitoring more tradition-
ally understood regulation. Once the regulatory nature of government
dispositions is recognized, utilizing these monitoring mechanisms
could well prove beneficial. The APA rulemaking procedures could
govern disposition determinations; OMB and Congress could clear
major agency dispositions prior to consummation; and Congress itself
could include its disposition determinations within the pay-as-you-go,
or PAYGO, framework, which requires each additional spending
program to be offset by a new revenue measure. As a package, such
changes might go far towards ensuring more accountable governance.
A. Enhancing Public Participation and Judicial Review
Several recommendations are appropriate. First, we suggest
that the APA be amended to delete or significantly alter the provision
excepting public property from the requirements of notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking. Government disposition programs, particularly
when they are not framed on market principles, require greater public
participation and more public scrutiny.
The regulatory character of property management is clear. It
makes little sense to exclude from the rulemaking requirements such
a large and important part of the federal regulatory apparatus.
Moreover, the need for monitoring through public participation is as
great-indeed if not greater-here than in the more common regula-
tory sphere. Monitoring is essential because of the danger that policy
initiated due to interest group influence may be adopted without any
public participation.
We also recommend along these lines that greater public par-
ticipation be encouraged where adjudication is used to manage or
dispose of public property. Our review of agency management and
disposition of property reveals that important policy and fiscal deci-
sions are made in the individual cases and that rulemaking-even
318. Accordingly, some have suggested converting the Forest Service into a public
corporation to enhance fiscal responsibility. See, e.g., O'TOOLE, supra note 176.
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with broad public participation--cannot resolve all issues. If the
public is excluded from these adjudications, it is unlikely that moni-
toring through public participation can occur. Accordingly, we
recommend that agencies amend their regulations to state explicitly
that individuals or groups with other than a direct economic interest
in the outcome of the adjudication be allowed to participate as "inter-
ested persons." These noneconomic interests could include those who
otherwise use the property for recreational or scientific purposes. But
more broadly it should include those with relevant information that
will assist the agency in its decisionmaking, regardless of whether
they actually use the property or are harmed by another's use.
Finally, we believe that judicial review should continue to play
an important role in monitoring agency disposition of assets. Given
the potential for interest group influence in both Congress and agen-
cies, judicial review provides another forum to minimize the chance
that agency policy initiatives serve private interests at the expense of
the general public. Review should only be precluded where Congress
has directed the agency to maximize revenue and sufficient incentives
exist to entrust the agency with that mission. 19
B. Amending Executive Order No. 12,866
In light of the shortcomings of judicial review and public par-
ticipation, however, some other means are necessary to check agency
disposition efforts. Political checks external to the agency are
warranted.
The Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") is one plausi-
ble monitor and coordinator of agency disposition schemes. Cur-
rently, agency disposition schemes escape any systematic presidential
oversight. Although major regulatory efforts by agencies (at least
those so-termed executive agencies whose heads can be dismissed at
will) are subject to scrutiny by OMB under Executive Order 12,866,20
no comparable means exist to monitor the sale of surplus government
furniture, the auctioning of broadcast spectrum rights, or the leasing
of oil rights. Such sales, auctions, and leases cannot be characterized
as "regulations" as defined in the Order.312 ' Although designing an
auction system might fall within the purview of the Order, each
319. See supra text accompanying notes 284-85.
320. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
557-61 (1994).
321. Regulation is defined as "an agency statement of general applicability and future effect
which the agency intends to have the force and effect of law .... " Id. at 641.
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disposition does not, for it lacks general applicability and future
effect. Agency actions implicating hundreds of millions of dollars
therefore are not currently subject to the Order. That omission is
unfortunate, for centralized coordination might reduce duplication of
agency efforts, help prevent agencies from conducting sales that bene-
fit themselves as opposed to the public at large, and generally would
illuminate the cost-benefit analysis underlying the various programs.
The current Executive Order3" mandates that regulations with
a projected impact of one hundred million dollars on the economy323 be
forwarded to OMB for analysis prior to promulgation.24 The Order
counsels agencies to identify the problems that they intend to
address, consider alternative ways to meet their regulatory goals,
assess the costs and benefits of the intended regulation, and base
their ultimate decision on "the best reasonably obtainable scientific,
technical, economic, and other information concerning the need for,
and consequences of, the intended regulation.""32 Moreover, the Order
requires agencies at the beginning of the year to forward a regulatory
plan to OMB that summarizes each significant planned regulatory
action, including alternatives considered and projected costs and
benefits.326 All significant regulations, in other words, must be justi-
fied on a cost-benefit basis, but other values may be taken into
account in defending the need for regulation.
Upon receipt of agency plans, OMB is to "provide meaningful
guidance and oversight so that each agency's regulatory actions are
consistent with applicable law, the President's priorities, and the
principles set forth in this Executive Order .... ,," The Order further
provides that review generally must be completed within ninety days
to avoid the delay that arguably plagued OMB review under the prior
schemes.32 OMB must also provide written explanation if it returns
any rule for greater analysis to the agency. 29 Finally, the Order
322. President Clinton's order followed President Reagan's initiatives with Exec. Order No.
12,291, 3 C.F.R. 128 (1981), and Exec. Order 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985).
323. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641. The Order also includes
regulatory actions that "materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees,
or loan programs." Id. § 3(f)(3). But sales or leases evidently do not fall within the traditional
notion of entitlements or user fees.
324. See id. § 6(a)(3)(A).
325. Id. § 1(b)(7).
326. See id. § 4(c)(2).
327. Id. § 6(b).
328. See THOMAS 0. McGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 282-83 (1991).
329. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(3), 3 C.F.R. 638, 647.
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directs that any continuing dispute between OMB and the agency be
resolved pursuant to a White House review process.
Presidential oversight of the asset decision pursuant to
Executive Order 12,866 could serve several critical functions. First,
review would, one hopes, impose greater accountability upon agencies
in disposing of government assets. Centralized review could dampen
interest group lobbying because of the President's and OMB's relative
insulation from interest group pressures. As the only official answer-
able in the electorate as a whole, the President can ensure that
agency policies be more responsive to the public interest. Many have
applauded the recent executive orders for that very reason.33 ° Of
course, the President and OMB are not entirely immune from interest
group pressure. The President relies on campaign contributions just
like any legislator, and he may be beholden to particular interests for
prior efforts on his behalf. But his national constituency diminishes
the likelihood of capture by any one focused group.
Centralized review, therefore, might limit the favoritism, or at
least perceived favoritism, that marked the FCC's initial determina-
tion to award licenses for free under its pioneer preference program,
and the Bureau of Land Management's decision to charge such a low
rate for grazing fee permits. To be sure, if interest groups unduly
influence Congress, OMB review is powerless to counteract that influ-
ence, as with the prescribed sale of government lands under the 1872
Mining Law. Yet OMB review can minimize the risk of agency cap-
ture by subjecting all disposition schemes to greater scrutiny.31 And
OMB is less likely to be subjected to narrow factional interests than
are the agencies. OMB does not have the often longstanding close
relationships with particular industries or trade groups that at times
affect agencies. Indeed, the current Executive Order minimizes the
330. See generally Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986); Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to
Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1994).
331. OMB has itself been criticized-particularly under Vice-President Quayle's tutelage-
as being too receptive to interest groups. See MCGARITY, supra note 328, at 285-91; Robert V.
Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental Protection
Agency, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 171-72 (1991); see also Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of
Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency
Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 28-35, 55-57 (1984).
Even where OMB has tried to monitor programs deemed wasteful, it has not always been
successful. See, e.g., Paul A. Sebatier et al., Hierarchical Controls, Professional Norms, Local
Constituencies, and Budget Maximization: An Analysis of U.S. Forest Service Planning
Decisions, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 204 (1995) (examining the importance of the OMB, as well as
other rules and pressures, in planning decisions of the U.S. Forest Service).
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prospect of OMB capture by largely prohibiting and publicizing ex
parte contacts.
OMB review would also shed light upon the actual costs and
benefits of each disposition scheme. As discussed previously, cur-
rently no agency clearly sets out the cost-benefit justifications of its
actions. The RTC decision to sell unbundled properties or the FCC
determination to honor a pioneer preference would all benefit from a
clear articulation of the advantages and disadvantages of the agency's
proposed route. Forcing agencies to articulate the financial and policy
benefits anticipated from the sale or lease of public assets can only
sharpen analysis. If the procedural steps in the Executive Order are
followed, OMB and agency officials might be able, for instance, to
ascertain the projected costs and benefits of timber cutting sales in
particular regions much more accurately than may currently be the
case. 0MB serves as something of a substitute for a market check on
agency action, to further the chance that revenue will be maximized
to the taxpayers' advantage.
This is not to suggest that the results of the cost-benefit analy-
sis should control. As this Article suggests, there are pressing
governmental policies that may underlie the disposition decision.
Social preservationist values are not easily commensurable with
questions of dollars and cents. The traditions of ranchers grazing
cattle on public lands cannot readily be compared with environmental
concerns or with public debt relief. But the costs and benefits of the
programmatic or distributional benefits should be known and con-
sidered before proceeding with a sale that does not maximize financial
return on the government's assets. Cost-benefit analysis should form
at least the first stage of the ultimate decision.33 Only then can the
political determination as to whether certain values override the
potential loss to the Treasury be reached.
Even if an agency determines that nonfinancial concerns
should predominate, OMB review can still help ensure that such goals
are implemented in as cost effective a manner as possible. The
Order's requirement that alternatives be considered imposes an im-
portant safeguard on agencies. Consider, for example, the recent FCC
auctions. In implementing distributional goals, the FCC did not
award licenses outright to designated entities, such as small busi-
nesses or firms owned predominantly by minorities or women.
Rather, the FCC awarded a bidding credit, which conceivably stimu-
332. See generally Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995).
17751999]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
lated competition for the licenses, and raised the ultimate price
received for the license."' In contrast, the FCC awarded licenses to
those firms receiving pioneer preferences without requiring the firms
to participate in the auction. Had the FCC awarded a bidding credit
instead, the increased competition may have enhanced the ultimate
price received for the licenses-whether or not the licenses were pur-
chased by the pioneers-diminishing the impact of granting the pref-
erence on the public fisc. OMB review may help agencies further even
programmatic goals efficiently.
Finally, review under Executive Order 12,866 might be benefi-
cial in allowing OMB to lend other agencies generalized expertise in
asset divestiture policies. Requiring agencies to submit their planned
sales or leases to 0MB may permit an informed second opinion on
how best to structure such divestiture efforts. The GSA or Customs
may administer sales the same way they have for the last ten years-
OMB scrutiny might prompt the agencies to consider alternate ways
to increase the yield.
Review might also be critical to avoid duplicative efforts. So
far, the FCC, for instance, has relied heavily upon outside consultants
to help structure the auctions. Their time working with experts has
been well spent.334 When the RTC attempted to structure an auction
in the real estate market several years ago, however, it retained a
different consulting firm with disastrous results.33 Moreover, the
RTC has sold houses at auctions that have been next door to houses
marketed by HUD. Combining forces in holding auctions can mini-
mize administrative costs and achieve economies of scale.33 0MB
could thus serve as a clearinghouse of information to help all agencies
333. See supra Part II.A.3.
334. See SYLVIA NASAR, A BEAUTIFUL MIND: A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN FORBES NASH, JR.,
WINNER OF THE NOBEL PRIZE IN ECONOMICS (1994); Economics Focus: Learning to play the game,
THE ECONOMIST, May 17, 1997, at 86 (describing initial success then setbacks in auction design
by economic experts).
335. See RTC OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT (1991) (concluding that poor
planning led to botched auction). See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RESOLUTION
TRUST CORPORATION: EFFECTIVENESS OF AUCTION SALES SHOULD BE DEMONSTRATED (1991)
(critiquing RTC satellite auction); Joel Achenbach, Between a Rock and a Hard Sell, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 1993, at Fl; Robert Sherefkin, RTC Fire Sale Goes Up in Smoke, 13 LEGAL TIMES, No.
29, Dec. 17, 1990, at 1.
336. The multi-agency Government Owned Real Estate (GORE) pilot program has attained
success by encouraging different agencies to work together in selling government assets, despite
each agency's different regulatory scheme. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT: DEBT
COLLECTION, IMPROVED REPORTING NEEDED ON BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN DELINQUENT DEBT &
AGENCY COLLECTION PERFORMANCE (1997), available in http://- www.gao.gov/pbs/pr/gore.htm>;
see also Government Asset Sales (visited Oct. 25, 1999), http://-www.financenet.gov/financenet-
sales> (bringing together government dispositions initiatives).
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structure asset sales and leases in ways that maximize return for the
public.
On balance, therefore, we urge amending Executive Order
12,866 to include asset disposition determination within the regula-
tory actions covered in the Order.337 OMB expertise and generalized
perspective should help eliminate inefficiencies and cabin rent-seek-
ing in agency disposition schemes. Because government sale and
leases of assets reflect regulatory policies as much as the more famil-
iar command-and-control regulation of the workplace, greater over-
sight both within and without the executive branch is required to
safeguard the public welfare.
C. Amending the Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
Congress enacted the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996338 to provide greater congressional review of
agency regulations. Each agency is required to submit final and
interim final rules for review by Congress and the General Accounting
Office before the final or interim final rules can take effect. 39 The Act
defines "rule" by reference to the APA, namely "an agency statement
of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement.., law or policy."34 In addition, the Act requires agencies
to submit a concise general statement relating to the rule, and (among
other obligations) to make available upon request a cost-benefit
analysis defending the rule. 41 The GAO is then to prepare a report on
the rule to Congress within fifteen days of receipt.342 In large part, the
regulatory requirement affects only those rules that have an annual
effect on the economy of one hundred million dollars or more, result in
337. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(d), 3 C.F.R. 636, 641 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
app. at 557-61 (1994). For the sake of consistency, the one hundred million dollar threshold in
the Executive Order should apply to dispositions as well, as long as the amount is calculated
based on the fair market value of the assets to be leased or sold. Agencies should proceed slowly
when disposing of assets with a value of that magnitude. At a minimum, the FCC auctions,
RTC sales, HUD sales, and Department of Interior's sales under the 1872 Mining Law, and
leases under the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act and Outer Continental Shelf Act would all fall
within the revised Order.
338. See Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996). That Act is a smaller part of the Contract with America
Advancement Act of 1996.
339. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A) (Supp. H 1997).
340. Id. § 804(3) (incorporating 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)).
341. See id. § 801(a).
342. See id. § 801(a)(2)(A).
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a steep increase in prices, or have a significant adverse effect on com-
petition, jobs, investment or productivity.343
The Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act in a sense mirrors
OMB oversight under Executive Qrder 12,866, and indeed its defi-
nition of significant rule is congruent with the Executive Order's
definition of regulation. Congress should have time to ensure both
the efficacy of proposed rules and their consistency with congressional
policy before the rules take effect. Through the procedures deline-
ated, Congress will have greater information and ability to assess the
impact of agency proposals and determine whether-subject to the
usual lobbying-to reject the agency rule before it takes effect.
In turn, agencies, realizing that their proposed regulations
must be submitted to Congress before they take effect, may be more
careful in crafting rules to minimize the chance for controversy when
reviewed by Congress. Agencies may cater to the same interest
groups that they believe have Congress's ear, but the Act in any event
forces them to defend the regulation on terms that both will help the
regulation escape the congressional roadblock and subsequently find
judicial sanction. Congress, for its part, cannot as readily pretend
that agency regulations had not received congressional approval. "
But, just as Executive Order 12,866 apparently exempts dispo-
sition decisions from the purview of regulations covered, so does the
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act. Agency decisions to sell sub-
stantial amounts of timber345 or to forego debt owed from the electro-
magnetic spectrum auction should be subject to the same congres-
sional review as the more familiar environmental or OSHA
regulations. Nonetheless, such determinations cannot be considered
rules, for they are not "statement[s] of general or particular applica-
bility." Some agency determinations governing disposition determi-
nations, such as that setting forth a particular auction mechanism,
qualify as rules and thus may be subject to the Act. But the sales,
leases, or donations themselves will escape such congressional
scrutiny. Thus, despite the mixed blessings of the Act,34 we urge
amending the Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act to include dispo-
sition decisions within its scope.
343. See id. § 804(2).
344. Congress also recently considered H.R. 1036, the Congressional Responsibility Act of
1997, which would require Congress to pass on every substantive regulation, apparently of any
scope, formulated by an agency.
345. Cf. supra note 176.
346. See generally Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review of Agency
Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 95 (1997).
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D. PAYGO Restraints
Greater judicial and OMB involvement in agency disposition of
assets, at least in areas not protected by market checks, would be a
welcome reform. Congress, moreover, can monitor agency disposition
decisions more directly through mechanisms such as the Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act. Greater checks on Congress itself would
provide a needed complement-restraints on agencies minimize but
hardly prevent congressional give-aways. Although we are not san-
guine about the political prospects for any such measures, Congress's
track record of blocking reform in the mining area and in divesting
electromagnetic spectrum highlight the need for further reform.
A central tenet of our analysis is that we should view property
disposition decisions as a type of regulation. And, as with other
regulations, wasteful disposition decisions can impose considerable
hidden expenses on the public. The government can cost the tax-
payers as much by donating mineral rights or electromagnetic spec-
trum as it can by building unneeded bridges, funding inefficient social
welfare programs, or by imposing costly regulations on firms. Once
this equivalence is understood, then Congress should subject disposi-
tion decisions to the same constraints limiting other spending
decisions.
For one example, as part of the Budget Enforcement Act of
1990, Congress initiated a pay-as-you-go or PAYGO mechanism.4 '
Each new congressional expenditure must be matched either by
increased taxation or by legislation generating additional revenues to
counteract the increased spending. If Congress fails in any fiscal year
to meet new spending with reductions elsewhere, certain direct
spending programs are automatically cut.348  PAYGO strives to
prevent new legislation from increasing the budget deficit or cutting
into any surplus.
PAYGO, however, applies only to direct spending and revenue
legislation, not below-market sales or leases of government assets.
The conceptual failure to link disposition decisions such as grazing fee
subsidies or below-market timber sales with more conventional direct
spending such as agricultural support payments or establishment of
new roads in the national forests is unfortunate. Congress has
missed, perhaps intentionally, an opportunity to constrain wasteful
government practices. Under PAYGO, ironically, below-market
347. See 2 U.S.C. § 902 (1994 & Supp. m1 1997).
348. See generally Garrett, Harnessing Politics, supra note 239, at 507-14.
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dispositions of government assets could be considered the additional
revenue needed to offset direct spending. Agencies have sold assets to
avoid budget limits in the past.49 Including below-market disposi-
tions in the congressional expenditures subject to PAYGO... would
have the salutary effect of forcing Congress more directly to inter-
nalize the "losses" from such disposition determinations.3"'
CONCLUSION
No one reform is likely to convert myriad agency disposition
practices to market-type efficiency overnight; nor should it, given the
many valuable nonmonetary goals underlying the disparate schemes.
Such aims, however, underscore the difficulty in monitoring disposi-
tion determinations, highlighting the need for both greater oversight
and attention to maximizing the return on public assets. Below-
market dispositions of government assets likely rob taxpayers of
billions of dollars each year. Given interest group lobbying and the
incentives facing both members of Congress and agency bureaucrats,
fundamental change cannot be expected shortly.
We have suggested that part of the contemporary failure to
monitor government property disposition effectively stems from our
political history, and part as well from an outmoded understanding of
349. See, e.g., Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment That Does
What It Is Supposed to Do (And No More), 106 YALE L.J. 1449, 1481-87 (1997); see also Johanna
H. Wald, The Presidio Trust and our National Parks: Not a model to be Trusted, 28 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 369, 376-77 (1998).
350. Consideration of more complete budget reform falls outside the scope of this Article.
For instance, one critical problem rests with our budget's cash flow premise. See generally
Garrett, Harnessing Politics, supra note 239.
351. For another example of reform at the congressional level, Congress in the Line Item
Veto Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 681, 691-692 (Supp. 11 1997), recently invalidated by the Supreme Court,
see Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998), had sought to minimize "runaway
federal spending and a rising national debt." 2 U.S.C. § 691(a). The Act empowered the
President to "cancel" certain new direct spending, specific dollar amounts of discretionary
budget authority, and limited tax benefits that were signed into law under Article I, section 7 of
the Constitution. The Act included discretionary budget authority for items such as new tanks,
government buildings, and irrigation projects, as well as direct spending authorized by law
other than an appropriation law, such as for farm subsidies or entitlements. See id. § 691e(5).
The giveaway or subsidized sale of mining rights or of the electromagnetic spectrum, however,
escaped the discipline of the Line Item Veto Act. An award of a pioneer preference, or a statute
granting a waiver of mining access fees, should be subject to the same constraints as statutes
establishing a federal telecommunications research center or construction of a dam in a national
forest. The risks of interest group pressure on legislators are comparable in both contexts.
Others have suggested a more substantial role for the President in related budget areas. See
Michael Fitts & Robert Inman, Controlling Congress: Presidential Influence in Domestic Fiscal
Policy, 80 GEO. L.J. 1737 (1992).
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administrative regulation in this country. Courts and commentators
have simply failed to appreciate the imperative to understand disposi-
tion decisions as regulation, and to impose oversight mechanisms
accordingly. Procedural changes of the type we have sketched above
will at least serve the heuristic value of stressing the regulatory
nature of what has previously been cordoned off as sale and lease
determinations. Property dispositions unquestionably affect behavior
as well as the public fisc, and the public would benefit if Congress and
the agencies proceeded more openly when selling, leasing, and giving
away public property.

